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ABSTRACT 
THREE INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE DYNAMICS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
IDENTITY-PROTECTIVE COGNITION FOR PUBLIC RESPONSES TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 
 
SEPTEMBER 2018 
 
DANIEL A. CHAPMAN, B.A., MILLERSVILLE UNIVERSITY  
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Brian Lickel 
 
In the case of responding to climate change and related environmental problems, opinions 
about the best course of action have become starkly polarized along ideological lines. The 
identity-protective cognition thesis posits that when individuals experience a sense of 
challenge to these identities, they are motivated to engage in cognitive shortcuts and other 
reasoning processes to protect these identities against threat. In this research, I discuss 
three investigations into identity-protective cognition in the context of responding to 
environmental problems, applying the broader identity-protective cognition framework to 
a diverse set of theoretical and practical questions. Chapter 2 highlights research 
exploring the effect of motivated reasoning on responses to natural disasters linked with 
climate change. Chapter 3 looks at how brand and environmental identities influence 
responses to corporate environmental scandals that are personally relevant and require 
individual-level action. Chapter 4 extends this research paradigm by exploring public 
responses to visual imagery used to depict climate change across three countries, while 
also examining how identity-protective processes shape these responses. In addition to 
 vii 
the theoretical and practical contributions for environmental engagement, explicit 
emphasis is placed on the use of full Bayesian inference for quantitative environmental 
decision making research. Implications for theory, methodology, and practice are 
considered.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A persistent problem in the practice of science communication is identifying the 
most effective strategies to communicate complicated scientific evidence in ways that are 
digestible by non-expert audiences. In cases where the scientific evidence points to risks 
that demand public attention and response, it is paramount that politicians and the public 
at large are well-informed, or at minimum willing to heed to the advice of domain 
experts. As such, the need for a public capable of recognizing, and ideally being 
motivated to respond to the risks posed by global challenges such as climate change 
cannot be understated.  
While a herculean task in and of itself, the difficulties in motivating public action 
are compounded when scientific evidence carries politically contentious implications, 
such as increased government regulation, or when an issue stance becomes synonymous 
with one particular political leaning. Views on climate change, for example, consistently 
rank as one of the most polarizing issues in American political discourse: 
Democratically-leaning individuals and politicians are on average more supportive of 
public action on climate change than those who are Republican-leaning (Egan & Mullin, 
2017). As this well-documented political polarization continues to carry implications for 
collective responses to climate change both nationally and internationally, the underlying 
social and cognitive processes driving this phenomenon warrant sustained attention. 
Furthermore, as similar polarization processes appear to be emerging among other 
scientific issues (e.g., mandatory vaccination), it is important to better understand their 
roots in order to develop effective responses (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017). 
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Here, I focus my efforts on the role of identity-protective cognition in influencing 
individuals’ responses to climate change and other environmental problems. Identity-
protective cognition is a broad theoretical perspective which aims to make sense of the 
ways in which individuals’ identities, worldviews, and ideological affiliations ‘pollute’ 
risk communication by biasing public acceptance and response to risk-relevant 
information (Kahan, 2017; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic, & Mertz, 2007). While the 
implications of identity-protective cognition apply to and vary by different subjects (e.g., 
gun control), the research emphasis in the work described here is placed squarely on the 
implications as they pertain to environmental problems, especially climate change.  
I begin by outlining the state of research on political polarization on climate 
change and other environmental issues, particularly in Anglophone nations where 
attitudes on these issues have become nearly synonymous with political identities. I then 
briefly consider several positions on the role of education and ideological beliefs in 
public acceptance of anthropogenic climate change. The aforementioned overview is 
followed by discussion of the underlying premises of identity-protective cognition and its 
roots in cultural theories of risk and motivated reasoning. Key questions of interest are 
identified, and the impetus for my research is explicated.  
Political Polarization and Environmental Problems 
There is well-documented evidence that, at least in industrialized Anglophone 
nations, public attitudes on the issue of climate change are heavily polarized along 
political lines (Dunlap, McRight, & Yarosh, 2016; Pugliese & Ray, 2011). Conservatives 
exhibit higher rates of climate change skepticism and lower rates of support for policy 
action, whereas the opposite tends to be true for liberals (Egan & Mullin, 2017). Indeed, 
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this polarization has been observed among both laypersons and politicians in countries 
such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany, among others (Pugliese & 
Ray, 2011).  
In the United States, a review of polling research found that as recently as 2015, 
roughly 84% of Democrats compared with nearly 40% of Republicans reported worrying 
about climate change ‘a great deal’ or a ‘fair amount; this polarization has fluctuated over 
the years, but the central pattern has been quite consistent (Egan & Mullin, 2017). In fact, 
despite small reductions observed since 2011 (Saad, 2017), the divide appears to be 
increasing again in the wake of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election (Brenan, 2018). This 
bifurcation of opinion has proven detrimental to coordinated societal action, exemplified 
by stalled environmental legislation and the recent decision of the United States to 
withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement (Volcovici, 2017). The observed pattern in 
Anglophone nations differs compared with much of the global political theater, where 
public concern about climate change appears to be less polarized (Capstick, Whitmarsh, 
Poortinga, Pidgeon, & Upham, 2015; Pugliese & Ray, 2011). However, limited high-
resolution temporal data for many nations makes inferences about these latter trends 
tentative.  
Further, the polarization in Anglophone nations stands decidedly at odds with the 
dominant view of national and international scientific organizations, such as the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, both of which endorse the major scientific opinion on anthropogenic 
contributions to climate change. Recent analyses of the scientific literature on climate 
change suggest that there is substantial consensus among domain experts, ranging 
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upwards of 90-100%, with regard to the existence of anthropogenic climate change 
(Cook et al., 2016).  
More troubling, evidence indicates that the climate change divide generalizes in 
large part to other environmental opinions: the partisan divide over environmental 
concern is stronger now than it has been in recent memory (Brenan, 2018). Further, other 
evidence suggests that partisan identities carry more predictive value for environmental 
preferences than economic concerns, an often-cited determining factor (Mildenberger & 
Leiserowitz, 2017). Thus, polarization over environmental problems tracks closely with 
rates for climate change concern. Considering the prominent place of climate change in 
modern public discourse relative to other environmental issues, it is perhaps not 
surprising that opinions on climate change have had psychological consequences for 
opinions on other environmental problems. 
Dual Perspectives on Environmental Attitude Polarization 
Given the clear divide between the opinions of scientific experts and the concerns 
of the general public (particularly among conservative-leaning ideologues), it is 
important to identify both its roots and implications. A variety of research perspectives 
have emerged on this topic, most specifically centered on the role of education and 
knowledge, and the role of ideological identities. 
One of the dominant perspectives in much of the history of science 
communication has been that it is the lack of effective and persistent education on the 
scientific evidence for climate change that is largely to blame for public inaction on 
climate and environmental problems (Kahan et al., 2012; Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & 
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Slovic, 2017). This, ‘knowledge-deficit’ position presents a sensible and appealing 
perspective: if public inaction is due primarily to a lack of knowledge or insufficient risk-
related information, then an antidote to this polarization is to take measures to increase 
education about the factual basis of climate change. Stated differently, a knowledge-
deficit position argues that public underestimation of the necessity to tackle climate 
change and environmental problems stems from a lack of knowledge among portions of 
society that are skeptical and/or unconcerned about the problem. 
As just one example of this knowledge-deficit perspective, a recent study found 
that greater domain-specific knowledge about the causes of climate change (but not other 
aspects of climate change knowledge) was associated with greater concern about climate 
change among a large U.S. sample of respondents, even while accounting for ideological 
differences (Shi, Visschers, Siegrist & Arvai, 2016). And, when making decisions about 
other immediately self-relevant risks (e.g., medical risks), individuals tend to heed to 
expert judgments on the best course of action, provided the best communication 
techniques are utilized (Trevena et al., 2013). However, other evidence suggests that this 
idealized picture of knowledge and deference to expertise may be hindered by political 
polarization on climate change and related environmental issues. 
Kahan and colleagues (2012), for example, found that greater knowledge was in 
fact associated with greater, rather than less, polarization among partisans, standing in 
direct contrast to the predictions of a knowledge-deficit position. High-knowledge 
liberals and high-knowledge conservatives exhibited the greatest (rather than smallest) 
degrees of divergence in their beliefs about climate change. This finding has been 
replicated in a host of contexts and data sets (see, for example, Funk, 2017; Funk & 
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Kennedy, 2016; Kahan et al., 2017). Recent evidence on the role of science literacy and 
education also indicates that higher levels of these characteristics are associated with 
greater polarization on a host of controversial scientific issues (Drummond & Fischhoff, 
2017). 
Further, a meta-analysis of social science research on climate change beliefs 
found that identities and worldviews, such as one’s political ideology or cultural values, 
are stronger predictors of climate change concern than predictors such as education level 
or knowledge about climate change (Hornsey et al., 2016). Research on the role of party 
cues in shaping climate change opinion also suggests that the electorate’s view of climate 
change aligns closely with the representatives of their political party or dominant political 
affiliation (Guber, 2017).  
Some scholars have claimed that educating the public on the 90-100% scientific 
consensus on climate change can in fact function as a ‘gateway’ belief, overcoming 
polarization and motivating greater concern, especially among moderates and 
conservatives (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015). Yet, while 
public awareness of scientific consensus has risen since 2015 (Hamilton, 2018), other 
aforementioned research indicates that polarization is in fact on the rise again, at least in 
the United States (Brenan, 2018). Furthermore, the research forming the foundation for 
this ‘gateway’ perspective has been challenged due to questionable analytic decisions 
(Kahan, 2017).  
Thus, the roles of knowledge and awareness of scientific consensus in motivating 
judgments of climate change risks appear to have become polluted by ideological 
affiliations. This position reflects a second, alternative thesis, rooted in the idea that 
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individuals tend to align their opinion on contentious issues such as climate change with 
those carrying similar ideological proclivities (e.g., conservatives aligning with the 
opinions of conservative opinion leaders), and are motived to construe information in 
ways that minimize challenges to their worldview (Kahan et al., 2017). The identity-
protective cognition thesis provides a more plausible explanation of the observed data on 
ideology and environmental polarization, making it a desirable alternative framework to 
the knowledge-deficit position. 
Identity-Protective Cognition and Environmental Engagement 
The identity-protective cognition thesis (ICT) holds the perspective that the public 
is generally capable of reasoning about risk-relevant information, but this capacity 
becomes obfuscated by conflict over cultural values and politicized identities (Kahan et 
al., 2007; Kahan et al., 2017). When applied to the case of climate change, this suggests 
that those on the political left and right hold different relevant cultural values (e.g., on the 
role of government intervention and regulation), and that individuals alter their purported 
opinions in ways that align with or signal support for the dominant position of those who 
share their worldview. For example, Campbell and Kay (2014) found that conservatives 
in the United States had less polarizing reactions to information about climate change and 
environmental problems when there was also suggestion that the solutions were not 
necessarily regulation-based.  
The ICT is not unique in offering this perspective, but rather draws on substantial 
backing from theory and research on motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) and the cultural 
theory of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Cultural theory provides a theoretical 
foundation for making sense of the influence of cultural values on the evaluation of risk-
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relevant information, offering a group-grid delineation of cultural values that vary within 
and across individuals to shape judgments of risks (Kahan, 2012). The group-grid 
framework outlines four worldview dimensions: egalitarian and communitarian (low grid, 
high group), as well as hierarchical and individualist (high grid, low group).  
Greater hierarchical and individualistic attitudes are typically thought of as being 
related to lower environmental risk perceptions, whereas egalitarian and communitarian 
values are associated with greater risk perceptions (e.g., Kahan, Jenkins-Smith & 
Braman, 2011). In support of this, Kahan et al. (2011) found empirical evidence that 
egalitarians and communitarians were more concerned about climate change than 
hierarchicalists and individualists. Furthermore, when asked to judge the credibility of a 
scientist depending on which view they held on the risk of climate change (low vs. high), 
respondents’ estimates of credibility were polarized along these worldview distinctions. 
Importantly, this effect was observed while holding the credentials of the scientist 
constant across treatment condition. 
Cultural theory is not without valid theoretical and empirical criticisms (Kahan, 
2012). For example, there is disagreement about the precise definitions and measurement 
of cultural worldviews, and in practice there has not been consistency in how these are 
analyzed quantitatively (e.g., combining hierarchical/individualist measures when they’re 
highly correlated, testing interaction effects). The degree to which the characteristics of 
these values emerge similarly across cultures is also not well established when it comes 
to grounded empirical measurement. However the chief role of cultural theory in the ICT 
is perhaps not to make definitive statements about the specific cultural values present in 
societies (hierarchical, egalitarian, etc.), but rather to provide a guiding basis for 
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examining how values and ideologies influence risk judgments through motivated 
reasoning processes (Kahan, 2012; Kahan et al., 2017). 
Motivated reasoning refers to a broad set of psychological findings demonstrating 
that individuals possess the capacity and motivation to selectively attend to and utilize 
information congruent with their preferred views or outcomes (Kunda, 1990; Ditto & 
Lopez, 1992; Rodriguez, Moskowitz, Salem, & Ditto, 2017). Revisiting the earlier 
example, Kahan et al. (2011) found that respondents selectively construed the credibility 
of a scientific expert when the expert offered a message incongruent with their own 
views. This process confers an ideologically-convenient approach to avoiding having 
one’s core values challenged with high frequency. At the societal level, such motivated 
responses are ubiquitous, and may not be at the forefront of conscious awareness; 
individuals generally prefer to affiliate with people holder similar values to their own, 
and tend to seek out information that validates rather than questions one’s own views. 
Importantly, scholars do not claim that the ICT applies to all, or even most policy 
and decision-relevant issues. Kahan and colleagues (2017) explicitly note the rare 
appearance of ICT across the issue spectrum, and the circumstances of its emergence may 
vary considerably from issue to issue. These are dimensions of ICT that are not yet well 
understood. Yet, the public polarization over climate change and environmental issues 
offers a unique and robust test case for exploring the ICT’s dimensions, and how it might 
apply to other issues. In spite of the growth in this area, questions of both theoretical and 
practical importance remain. In the research I describe here, I focus on three questions 
spanning different contexts and scales. 
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Unanswered Questions Motivating this Research 
First, the potential for downstream, second-order effects of identity-protective 
cognition have not been thoroughly explored. That is, it is not yet well established 
whether the motivated reasoning processes that bias climate change attitudes have 
implications for other topics that have become associated with climate change in public 
discourse. For example, if an extreme weather event is explicitly framed as being caused 
by climate change, does this influence how the public, especially conservatives and 
climate change skeptics, perceive the disaster and disaster victims? Chapter 2 will 
provide more background on this area, and will discuss a survey experiment that was 
designed to evaluate this question. 
Second, only limited research has looked at how those with greater identification 
as environmentalists respond to environmental disasters (e.g., Clayton, Koehn, & Grover, 
2013). Work in this domain has not comprehensively explored whether characteristics of 
a specific environmental problem, such as personal relevance or the activation of other 
valued social identities, modulate how identities affect responses. Relatedly, a largely 
understudied topic in the context of social identity and motivated reasoning research is 
the degree to which multiple identities may be simultaneously active and interact to 
influence decision making. Chapter 3 will provide evidence from a survey study 
examining these questions in the context of an ongoing (at the time of this writing) 
environmental scandal. 
Third, while there is a growing interest in the role of visual imagery in persuasive 
communication about climate change (for a review, see Wang, Corner, Chapman & 
Markowitz, 2018), this research has not yet been brought into conversation with the ICT 
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literature. Thus, it is not known whether the polarizing effects of ICT emerge similarly 
when individuals are reacting to visual imagery as when they are reacting to primarily 
text-based mediums. It is also unknown if presenting certain types of visual imagery may 
more effectively overcome the effects of identity-protective cognition. Chapter 4 will 
provide an overview on research into climate change visual imagery and public 
perceptions, and will describe a cross-national investigation containing findings on how 
the public responds to climate change imagery. Importantly, this work draws on both 
qualitative and quantitative data to understand perceptions of imagery, which is 
accompanied by a follow-up set of statistical models exploring the influence of cultural 
worldviews and political identities in particular. 
Overview of Dissertation Content 
To recap, the following chapters provide a comprehensive description of three 
different examinations into the dynamics and implications of ICT for responding to 
environmental problems. Specifically, I am to address: 
1. What is the effect of identity-protective cognition on humanitarian responses to 
climate-linked extreme weather events? 
2. How does identity-protective cognition influence judgments of personal 
responsibility for environmental scandals? 
3. How does the public respond to visual imagery used to depict climate change, 
and how are responses influenced by the type of image and cultural worldviews of the 
respondents?  
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While these investigations are each unique in their approach and the particular 
questions addressed, they share a common goal of better understanding the theoretical 
and practical implications of identity-protective cognition, particularly as it pertains to 
climate change and other instances of environmental degradation. As such, each chapter 
is written to stand as its own complete document, drawing from distinct literatures and 
carrying different implications. Between each chapter covering empirical research, a 
bridge is provided to more comprehensively synthesize each set of findings and 
theoretical perspectives together and provide fluent transitions. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss the findings of an online survey experiment examining 
how motivated reasoning processes associated with climate change skepticism influence 
public responses to humanitarian disasters that become explicitly associated with climate 
change. The research discussed in this chapter was recently published as Chapman and 
Lickel (2016), and is reproduced here as it appeared in print (see Appendix A for full 
citation, in accordance with the publisher’s copyright regulations). These findings suggest 
that the implications of ICT and political polarization over climate change extend beyond 
the issue itself to also influence public responses to complex problems such as natural 
disasters, which are frequently linked to climate change in public discourse. In addition to 
the full original paper, additional follow-up analyses are included, and discussion is 
offered in the bridge reflecting on recent research by scholars which supports and extends 
these findings. 
Chapter 3 describes research conducted in the aftermath of the recent Volkswagen 
diesel emissions scandal to examine how affected owners’ social identities influence their 
perceptions of culpability in the scandal and willingness to take steps to ameliorate the 
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problem. In particular, this work examines how environmental and brand identities 
interact to produce important insights into how owners of affected vehicles conceptualize 
their responsibility for contributing to and addressing the harmful environmental effects 
of the scandal. In addition to the interesting theoretical insights regarding interactive 
processes, this work also carries practical implications for understanding responses to an 
unexpected and ongoing environmental scandal. The bridge from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4 
extrapolates from the interactive identity findings to broader implications for ICT. 
The majority of quantitative research has investigated ICT as provoked through 
text-based mediums, such as the framing research described in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 will 
report on a large multi-national examination of the role of visual imagery in shaping 
public perceptions of climate change. The content for this chapter stems from a recent 
mixed-methods publication (Chapman, Corner, Webster & Markowitz, 2016; see 
Appendix A for full citation and publication details), and is reproduced in full as it 
appeared in print. While the main body of research in Chapter 4 was not specifically 
designed to tap into ICT, it is included both for transparency into the research process and 
due to the interesting and valuable contextual insights it provides regarding climate 
change imagery. The data set from this paper also contains Kahan et al.’s (2011) cultural 
worldviews scales, which were not reported on fully in Chapman et al. (2016) due to the 
size and scope of the original publication (i.e., to provide a descriptive overview of 
general imagery principles). Chapter 4 thus includes a detailed addendum containing new 
analyses to explore the role of cultural worldviews and political ideology in influencing 
climate change skepticism, perceptions of climate change imagery, and perceived threats 
from climate change.  
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The addendum for Chapter 4 presents conceptually driven models focusing on 
estimation and measurement uncertainty rather than hypothesis testing. These analyses 
incorporate Bayesian hierarchical regression, a technique that has received limited 
attention in this literature, in order demonstrate its potential utility in pushing ICT 
research into the future. This is a particularly warranted demonstration given the 
conceptual value of thinking about motivated reasoning processes more broadly from a 
Bayesian perspective (Kahan, 2016). These analyses explore the relationship among the 
cultural worldviews, as well as their variability across nations, the types of climate 
change imagery presented (e.g., images of causes, impacts, or solutions), political 
ideology, and various demographics. Bayesian hierarchical models were used to predict a 
subset of survey responses to the climate change imagery (e.g., support for policy, 
emotional response) from these predictors. In concluding, I integrate and summarize the 
findings, implications, and limitations of each study, as well as consider key points—both 
theoretical and practical—engendered by this work.  
A Note on Analytic Philosophy and Bayesian Inference 
I rely on a combination of frequentist (i.e., significance testing, sampling-based 
inference) and Bayesian analytic approaches. A mixture of approaches was used for 
several reasons. As noted prior, two of the chapters stem from work that has been 
previously published. In the interest of transparency and completeness, this work is 
reproduced exactly as it appeared in published form, using frequentist analyses such as 
null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) and confidence interval-based estimation. 
Since the publication of these works, I have begun primarily adopting a Bayesian 
approach to probability and statistical inference, the rationale for which is described at 
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length below. Therefore, I also provide a Bayesian re-analysis of the work discussed in 
Chapter 2. The results in Chapter 3 are described from a Bayesian perspective 
throughout. In addition to providing the frequentist results of the published work in 
Chapter 4, new analyses complimenting this work were performed using Bayesian 
hierarchical regression modeling. 
Background on Bayesian and Frequentist Inference 
While Bayesian views on probability have been around since the 1700’s (Bayes, 
1764), computing limitations prevented large-scale application. Modern computing 
advances and the development of Markov Chain Monte Carlo, coupled with increasingly 
efficient algorithms (e.g., Hamiltonian Monte-Carlo), have vastly increased the feasibility 
of Bayesian analysis for applied research. Bayesian data analysis has a variety of benefits 
making it a desirable alternative to frequentist maximum likelihood approaches for many 
applications (Gelman, 2017). While a full description of the approach of Bayesian 
statistics and philosophies of probability are beyond the scope of this document (see, e.g., 
Gelman & Shalizi, 2013), it is worth noting several important properties to guide the 
reader in interpreting Bayesian models. Simplified, Bayesian data analysis is the process 
of combining prior information (priors) with new observations (the likelihood) to 
generate full distributions (posteriors) of plausible estimates for quantities of interest (i.e., 
prior × likelihood = posterior).  
More formally, Bayesian data analysis relies on the application of Bayes’ theorem 
for statistical inference. Bayes theorem states: 
P(θ|D) = P(D|θ) × P(θ)P(D)  
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𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃|𝐷𝐷) describes the posterior probability of an unknown parameter, 𝜃𝜃(theta), given the 
data, D. 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷|𝜃𝜃) denotes the marginal likelihood of observing D from a model with 𝜃𝜃. 
𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃) encodes prior information formally about the parameters of interest, and 𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷) 
reflects the evidence accumulated in the data (Kruschke, 2014). 
The Role of Priors in Bayesian Inference 
Bayesian analyses directly encode and make explicit the uncertainty and degree of 
subjectivity in statistical models. This is done both through the necessity of directly 
specifying reasonable priors, and the generation of full distributions of plausible posterior 
estimates. Priors may represent specific ‘beliefs’ about plausible values informed by past 
research, or may fulfill other goals, such as ruling out strictly implausible values and 
improving model convergence (Gelman & Shalizi, 2013; McElreath, 2016). In this 
research, I generally follow recommendations derived from Gelman et al. (2013; see also, 
Gelman, 2006) and the Stan Development Team (2018) to develop prior specifications. 
Research by these teams and others suggests that using priors which provide enough 
information to improve estimation and convergence but that do not overly restrict 
parameters to specific prior findings typically produce more accurate estimates than 
overly restrictive or vague priors (see Betancourt, 2017). This philosophy of prior 
specification is commonly referred to as the specification of ‘weakly informative’ priors, 
or ‘regularizing’ priors. A similar conclusion for using these types of priors, though for 
slightly different theoretical reasons (e.g., maximum entropy), is arrived at by McElreath 
(2016).  
While the addition of priors is often a source of consternation among those 
unfamiliar with this approach, priors are always involved in statistical modelling, whether 
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the researcher is fully aware of them or not. Frequentist ordinary least squares regression, 
for instance, technically includes the ‘prior’ that all possible outcome values are 
uniformly plausible, whether it be, for example, -100 or 2. And, methods such as LASSO 
and ridge regression place restrictions on the size (and inclusion) of parameter values to 
help avoid overfitting. While using so-called ‘non-informative’ priors might sound like a 
more reasonable approach when prior knowledge is limited, these can lead to misleading 
estimates or cause model convergence problems depending on the amount of data and the 
models specified (Betancourt, 2017). Furthermore, treating all values as equally plausible 
a priori, technically is not a ‘non-informative’ prior as it does encode a belief, so the 
name may be more misnomer than reality. 
Therefore, at the absolute minimum, Bayesian approaches allow the researcher to 
include some information to improve estimation and accuracy (e.g., restricting the most 
plausible regression coefficients to be between, say, -2 and +2 on a standardized scale). 
This approach is valuable when prior information is minimal and it is reasonable to rule 
out large values. For instance, a linear interaction between two standardized (M = 0, SD = 
1) scales containing varying measurement error is unlikely to produce effects larger than 
2 units on a 1-5 outcome scale, purely based on the characteristics of such measurement. 
This is especially pertinent in the context of hierarchical regression (aka hierarchical 
modeling, multi-level modelling, mixed effects modeling).  
Whereas non-Bayesian hierarchical regression typically requires a considerable 
amount of data to provide even rough estimates of multi-level structures (e.g., 
recommendations for having 6-to-8 or more groupings to estimate a hierarchical effect), 
Bayesian hierarchical regression is capable of estimating models with fewer restrictions, 
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in part due to the ability of specifying regularizing priors to enable model convergence 
(Gelman & Hill, 2006; McElreath, 2016). Indeed, the algorithms involved in frequentist 
hierarchical models based on maximum likelihood estimation may produce implausible 
estimates, or may not converge at all on an acceptable solution when few groups are 
estimated and variability is low. The partial pooling of variance in Bayesian hierarchical 
models tends to produce more stable, conservative estimates than non-hierarchical 
models or non-Bayesian implementations as well (McElreath, 2016). 
Bayesian Posterior Distributions and Uncertainty Intervals 
Bayesian data analysis generates entire distributions of plausible outcome 
estimates rather than single maximum likelihood point estimates. What this offers is the 
opportunity to evaluate a full range of plausible values with different degrees of assigned 
probability, conditional on the model specified. Evaluation of the full posterior 
distributions and other model characteristics, particularly through visual representations 
(Gabry, Simpson, Vehtari, Betancourt & Gelman, 2018), can help to better understand 
the range and uncertainty of parameter values. In contrast, the traditional form of 
quantifying estimation uncertainty in frequentist methods is to use the standard error to 
calculate 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) around an estimate of interest. However, 
these intervals are notoriously difficult to properly interpret given their basis in long-run 
sampling assumptions, even by seasoned researchers; such confidence intervals are 
frequently given probabilistic interpretations about plausible values that are not warranted 
(Morey, Hoekstra, Rouder, Lee, & Wagenmakers, 2016). For instance, if a confidence 
interval ranges from .05 to .65 for a regression estimate of .32, values at the ends of this 
interval are equally as plausible as values closer to the maximum likelihood estimate. 
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In contrast, Bayesian data analysis allows the researcher to correctly apply 
probabilistic interpretations across a full distribution of plausible values. When 
summarization is desired, highest posterior density intervals (HPDI) can be used, as these 
have a direct probabilistic interpretation: the 95% HPDI’s include the range of values that 
capture 95% of the posterior density, with values closer to the center of the distribution 
capturing greater probability than values at the tails. However, it is important to 
emphasize that using 95% HPDI intervals, as opposed to 90%, 89%, or 50% is arbitrary, 
as these are simply summaries of the full distributions and are not connected to 
hypothesis testing or error rate calculations (McElreath, 2016). 
The Philosophy of Bayesian Estimation in Comparison to Other Approaches 
This form of full Bayesian inference stands in decided contrast to misapplications 
of null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The binary-decision making induced by 
such approaches, while most valuable when applied carefully and strictly, is not 
adequately designed to address the questions of interest for the majority of the work 
described in this manuscript, and arguably of the social sciences more broadly (see 
Gelman, 2017 for a discussion). Amidst a pervasive crisis of confidence in the published 
literature primarily based on NHST (e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015), alternatives 
that shift the analysts perspective back toward quantifying predictions and uncertainty, 
rather than relying on binary decisions, are desirable. Indeed, several statisticians and 
researchers summarized this sentiment well in a recent proposal to abandon ‘statistical 
significance’ altogether (McShane, Gal, Gelman, Robert, & Tackett, 2018). Substantive 
interpretation of the Bayesian models in this manuscript, derived from this perspective. 
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For a similar rationale, I opt to not compute ‘Bayes Factors’ for the models 
estimated (Jeffreys, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1993). In spite of their growing popularity in 
the psychological sciences, a number of Bayesian statisticians and researchers caution 
against the use of Bayes Factors and demonstrate potential problems in their 
use/interpretation (e.g., Gelman & Carlin, 2017; Kruschke, 2014; Robert, 2016; Stern, 
2017). For example, Bayes Factors have been shown to be much more sensitive to the 
prior specifications of each model compared, whereas this is not typically the case for 
estimation-based approaches (Kruschke, 2014; Gelman et al., 2013). Furthermore, while 
not in any way a natural byproduct of their computation (see, e.g., Morey, Romeijn & 
Rouder, 2016), the use of the size of a Bayes Factor to declare ‘significance’ or 
importance through the use of qualitative labels (e.g., Jeffreys, 1961; Wetzels et al., 
2011) runs the risk of inducing the same binary decision-making that plagues NHST. 
Bayes factors are perhaps most useful when the researcher has two or more specific 
hypothesized models to compare (as opposed to comparing against a non-informative 
‘null’ model). Furthermore, if the analyst has the knowledge to specify priors in this way, 
there is arguably little extra value gained from reporting Bayes Factors above and beyond 
what can be gleaned from interval estimation of the parameters of interest, as these 
directly quantify effects on the relevant scale. Nevertheless, an admirable goal of future 
research on ICT would be to develop informative priors to enable implementation of 
Bayes Factors and other likelihood-based comparisons, alongside estimation approaches. 
The Philosophy of Model Interpretation in the Current Research 
As noted prior, I focus the most substantive portion of my model interpretations 
on the full posterior distributions, depicting the range of plausible values generated by the 
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model for parameters of interest. Posterior predictive checks (i.e., evaluating whether the 
model predictions accurately reflect the distribution of the outcome measure), MCMC 
diagnostics (e.g., effective sample size, trace plots, Rhat), and related model checks were 
performed, and were satisfactory for all models reported unless otherwise noted. Most of 
the technical output of these steps are omitted from the text purely for the sake of length 
and clarity, though a description of these as they relate to each model can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Evaluation of the full Bayesian posterior distributions is accompanied by a 
discussion of model comparisons based on estimated out-of-sample predictive 
performance where relevant. In contrast to the use of Bayes Factors or related means of 
comparing models, I focus here on estimated out-of-sample predictive performance 
through the use of information theory approaches, in part to emphasize the ultimate goal 
of having generative models to accurately predict outcomes of interest in future 
observations (Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017). Making modelling decisions based on 
statistical significance is actively discouraged, and using an out-of-sample predictive 
approach is known to help better mitigate the risk of overfitting statistical models 
(McElreath, 2016). However, it is important to take these estimates in a cautionary 
manner, and avoid making strong model decisions (e.g., choosing the ‘best’ model to 
interpret and fully discarding others) based on such comparisons (Gelman & Rubin, 
1995).  
While this approach to inference may not seem fully satisfying to some readers 
given the prevalence of NHST in the social sciences, selection through NHST is more 
likely to give the analyst an illusion of statistical certainty than an accurate understanding 
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of true model performance. Further, information criteria approaches may help put 
potentially interesting theoretical findings within a broader context; ‘significant’ 
interaction effects, for instance, may do little to improve prediction estimates in some 
cases (i.e., statistical significance overstates practical significance). In this work, I rely 
primarily on leave-one-out cross-validation comparisons as an information criterion 
(LOO IC) to estimate out-of-sample performance. In contrast of other related methods 
(e.g., splitting data into training and testing sets, or using AIC/DIC), Bayesian LOO 
approximates out-of-sample fit calculations while leaving one data point out per iteration 
(Vehtari et al. 2017). This approach is computationally intensive, but demonstrates 
superior accuracy to other methods such as AIC while also allowing efficient use of all 
data collected.  
Therefore, I report LOO IC when aiming to compare related models (e.g., 
comparing models with or without a theoretically informed interaction term) and to 
roughly estimate out-of-sample predictive performance. The ‘loo’ package for R was 
used for computing LOO IC, which also calculates difference scores between models as 
well as a standard error of this estimate (see Vehtari et al. 2017). Given the relatively 
large samples employed in this research, the reader may loosely interpret better model 
performance by models with lower LOO IC scores, particularly when the size of the 
difference between LOO IC scores is larger than 2 or more standard errors. However, this 
is not a formal statistical test and has no connection to NHST, and should thus not be 
interpreted as such when making model decisions. 
Paul Bürkner’s ‘brms’ package for R (Burkner, 2017), which harnesses the Stan 
programming language (Carpenter et al., 2017) to conduct full Bayesian inference, was 
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used for all Bayesian analyses reported. Stan uses Hamiltonian Monte Carlo with a No-
U-Turn Sampler, an efficient and flexible approach to Bayesian analysis when compared 
with older samplers such as JAGS/BUGS (Carpenter et al. 2017). The ‘bayesplot’ 
package (Gabry & Mahr, 2017) was used along with ‘brms’ to graphically depict the 
posterior distributions and decompose model interactions where relevant. There are a 
variety of considerations involved in the specification of priors and the aforementioned 
sampling algorithms. To avoid repetition and provide and easy reference point, a full 
technical description of the models, including all prior specifications and any adjustments 
to Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling can be found in the Appendix B. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISASTERS 
 
Introduction 
Climate research is beginning to link extreme weather events to climate change, 
and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fifth Assessment report 
warns that climate change could result in increased incidences or intensity of heat waves, 
heavy precipitation events, and droughts (IPCC, 2013). While it is not possible to directly 
attribute any single disaster to climate change in the immediate aftermath, media outlets 
often discuss this link in the wake of natural disasters (e.g., typhoon Haiyan; Sobel, 
2013; Vidal & Carrington, 2013). As scientific consensus about the risks of climate 
change has grown more solid, research has also documented an increase in ideological 
polarization of public attitudes about climate change (Guber, 2013; McCright & Dunlap, 
2011). This polarization affects individuals’ decision making on environmentally related 
issues. For example, recent research has shown that framing product purchases in pro-
environment terms (e.g., “Protect the Environment”) can actually result in reduced 
intentions for purchasing the product among those likely to be skeptical of climate 
change (Gromet, Kunreuther, & Larrick, 2013). 
In the current research, we investigated whether individuals’ preexisting 
ideological beliefs about climate change might influence how they perceive natural 
disasters (in particular, food deprivation due to drought) and associated relief efforts 
when these events are framed as caused by climate change. We incorporate prior findings 
from the motivated reasoning literature and propose a distinct second order motivated 
reasoning effect: Ideological biases might extend beyond the interpretation of evidence 
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about an issue itself (i.e., direct motivated reasoning effects) and have second-order 
effects on how individuals construe information about world events framed in light of 
this polarizing issue (e.g., influencing reactions to a natural disaster when it is linked to 
climate change). 
A wealth of past research on motivated reasoning indicates that people are often 
not even handed evaluators of facts and evidence and instead construe information to 
justify their preferred beliefs and outcomes (Kunda, 1990; Uhlmann, Pizarro, 
Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009). These motivational processes have been found to influence 
outcomes ranging from attitudes about capital punishment (Liu & Ditto, 2013) to 
demands for justice for torture victims (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). 
Important for the current study, research on motivated reasoning and the related process 
of cultural cognition also suggests that individuals construe scientific information in 
ideologically motivated ways (Kahan, 2013). Individuals’ beliefs about climate change 
and perceptions of scientific consensus are, according to this research, molded in part by 
their preexisting beliefs; ideology and worldviews, rather than scientific illiteracy, may 
be to blame for low levels of public concern about climate change (Hart & Nisbet, 
2012; Kahan et al., 2011; Kahan et al., 2012). Beliefs about the benefits and risks of 
technological advances also appear to be shaped by ideological motives, which influences 
attitudes toward important policy issues such as the use of nanotechnology (Kahan, 
Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2009) and nuclear energy (de Groot, Steg, & Poortinga, 
2013). 
This ever-growing body of literature demonstrates the power of ideological biases 
in affecting judgments of information relevant to public policy, scientific knowledge, and 
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risk perception. What has not yet been explored is whether the ideological biases one 
holds about a polarizing issue such as climate change could also have secondary effects 
on how individuals respond to world events, such as natural or technological disasters, 
that are framed as being caused by this issue (e.g., reactions to victims of a drought that is 
linked to climate change). Although misconstruing facts about climate science itself bears 
a direct motivational link to the ideology of climate change skeptics, their perceptions of 
victim need following a natural disaster should not logically be influenced by whether the 
disaster is linked to climate change or not. We propose that this disaster framing might 
motivate skeptics to disengage from helping the victims by downplaying the severity of 
the disaster and endorsing beliefs that aid will be ineffective. Thus, not only should 
climate change skepticism influence the perceptions of whether the cause of the disaster 
is anthropogenic or not, but it should also have distal (i.e., not logically connected), 
second-order effects on how they perceive the victims and need for aid following a 
disaster framed as being caused by climate change. 
To test this hypothesis, we examined participants’ attitudes toward disaster 
victims after reading about a famine ostensibly caused by anthropogenic climate change 
compared to a famine caused by “normal” droughts. We predicted that those skeptical of 
climate change would be motivated to construe information about victim need and the 
effects of the disaster differently when it is framed as resulting from climate change. Due 
to the inconsistency of this disaster framing with their ideology, we hypothesized that 
skeptics would react against this frame by utilizing any aid-related justifications that 
would allow them to disengage from the helping context and downplay the disaster, such 
as perceiving less need for outside aid, blaming the victims, and describing aid as 
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ineffective or corrupt. Given the conceptual and empirical link between aid justifications 
and donation decisions (e.g., Zagefka, Noor, Brown, Hopthrow, & Randsley de Moura, 
2012), we predicted that the increase in negative justifications would in turn predict less 
positive attitudes toward donating to relief efforts. Conversely, for those low in 
skepticism, we predicted that this disaster framing could increase positive justifications 
(e.g., greater perceived need) since the climate change framing is consistent with non-
skeptics’ beliefs that current climate changes are at least partially human caused. 
Furthermore, while we expected a significant relationship between political conservatism 
and climate change beliefs (e.g., McCright & Dunlap, 2011), we predicted that 
participants’ climate change beliefs (rather than political ideology) would form the 
specific motivational foundation for disengagement from a disaster scenario framed as 
related to climate change. Therefore, we measured individuals’ beliefs about climate 
change as well as political ideology to test the relative influence of each on reactions to 
victims of a disaster linked (or not) to climate change. 
Methods 
Participants 
We recruited participants with the goal of having 100 participants in each of the 
two conditions. Because we did not know the effect size for this manipulation, we 
couldn’t conduct a formal power analysis, but we chose 100 participants per condition as 
a conservative sample size. We knew from past experience that we would have some 
attrition (due to inattention to the manipulation, etc.) in our MTurk sample. On the day on 
which our MTurk sample size was over 200, we let the study continue for the remainder 
of the day. At this point, we had a sample of 235. Prior to analysis, 24 participants were 
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excluded for either indicating on a self-report measure that they did not take the study 
seriously or for spending unusually short or long amounts of time reading the 
manipulation materials (less than 15 s or greater than 18 min). The final sample used for 
analyses consisted of the remaining 211 participants (Mage= 36.79, SD = 13.39; 51.7% 
male; 82% White; 100% U.S. citizens). Participants were paid 50 cents for completing 
the study. 
Materials and Procedure 
The study was described to participants as a survey of individuals’ attitudes 
toward relief efforts after disasters. All participants completed a consent form prior to 
participation and were debriefed using an online form at the end of the survey. During the 
study, participants read a news article containing the manipulation and then answered a 
series of survey questions about justifications for or against helping the victims, attitudes 
about donating, and climate change beliefs. At the end of the study, participants answered 
demographic questions (age, sex, etc.). 
The news article described a famine in Sub-Saharan Africa caused by a series of 
severe droughts (adapted from Zagefka, Noor, Brown, Randsley de Moura, & Hopthrow, 
2011). We manipulated whether the famine was caused by severe droughts (control 
condition) or by severe droughts linked to climate change (climate change condition). 
Other than the climate change manipulation, content was constant across conditions. 
After reading the news story, participants completed a set of dependent measures 
and individual difference measures. To determine whether linking the droughts and 
famine to climate change increased the degree to which participants perceived the 
disaster as human caused, two questions regarding perceived cause of the disaster were 
 29 
included at the end of the survey (e.g., “To what extent do you think the disaster 
mentioned in the article was caused by human actions,” 1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
These 2 items were combined into a composite with higher scores indicating greater 
belief that the disaster was human caused (M = 3.57, SD = 1.55, α = .78). 
Donation decision justifications and attitudes about donating 
After the manipulation, participants responded to measures addressing their 
attitudes toward donating to relief operations as well as their justifications to provide or 
withhold aid. These measures were adapted from recent research by Zagefka and 
colleagues and are described at length subsequently (for a complete discussion, 
see Zagefka et al., 2012; Zagefka et al., 2011). All donation-related measures were scored 
on 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Table 1 displays the 
correlations between climate change skepticism, conservatism, and each of the donation-
related measures. 
Participants first responded to a measure of donation attitudes, which assessed 
their intentions to donate as well as their beliefs that donating to the victims was the right 
thing to do in this disaster context. These attitudes about donating were assessed with a 5-
item composite (e.g., “I would be willing to give donations to the victims of this 
disaster,” M = 4.60, SD = 1.32, α = .91). This measure was coded such that higher scores 
indicated more positive attitudes toward donating. 
We then measured justifications to provide or withhold donations using five 
interrelated constructs, each of which have been demonstrated to influence donation 
decisions in past research on natural and human-caused disaster events (see Zagefka et 
al., 2012; Zagefka et al., 2011, for a detailed discussion). Zagefka, Noor, Brown, 
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Hopthrow, and Randsley de Moura (2012) found that when asked to provide rationales 
for donating (or not) to various disasters, participants’ most frequently cited rationales 
included those relating to perceptions of need, perceived impact of donations, beliefs 
about how much others have donated, the cause of the disaster, and victim blaming. Also 
frequently mentioned were beliefs about the extent to which victims were seen as helping 
themselves, which has been shown in experimental research to also play an important 
role in aid decisions (Zagefka, et al., 2011). Given these findings and the additional 
experimental research by Zagefka and colleagues, we selected these five constructs 
(excluding “cause of the disaster,” as this was our manipulation) to include as our 
measures of donation justifications. Theoretically, these constructs broadly encapsulate 
perceptions of the disaster victims (e.g., are the victims to blame, are they taking steps to 
help themselves) as well as beliefs about the efficacy of donating to the relief efforts 
(e.g., is aid likely to reach those most in need, are enough other people likely donating). 
All five measures of donation justifications were coded such that higher scores indicated 
greater justifications to withhold donations (e.g., greater victim blame, less perceived 
victim need). 
Two items measured perceived need of relief donations, which were designed to 
address the perceived severity of the disaster and the necessity for donations to help the 
victims (e.g., “I believe that there is a huge need for outside help after this disaster,” M 
= 2.68, SD = 1.20, r = .70). Four items measured victim blaming, focusing on the extent 
to which the victims were perceived as at fault for their current situation (e.g., “I think the 
victims of the disaster might have been responsible for their plight themselves at least to 
some extent,” M = 2.18, SD = 1.26, α = .94). 
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Perceived victim self-help was also measured with 4 items focusing on 
perceptions of whether the victims were actively trying to improve their situation or not 
(e.g., “I believe that the victims did everything humanly possible to improve their 
situation the best they could,” M = 2.72, SD = 1.26, α = .91). 
Two items measured participants’ beliefs about donation sufficiency (i.e., do 
donations by others make personal donations unnecessary? “I believe that so many other 
people have or will still donate to the victims of this disaster that my own help is 
unnecessary,” M = 3.19, SD = 1.40, r =.85). These items addressed assumptions about 
how others are or are not responding to the disaster (for an extended discussion, 
see Zagefka et al., 2012). Participants then responded to 4 items assessing their beliefs 
about donation impacts, including whether they believed that aid would be effective and 
reach those most in need (e.g., “I believe that money donated to the victims of this 
disaster most likely doesn’t reach the victims, but just benefits corrupt politicians and 
fanatics in power positions,” M = 3.57, SD = 1.40, α = .92). 
Climate change skepticism and political ideology 
After the donation-related measures, participants responded to a battery of items 
designed by the researchers to assess attitudes related to climate change. Five items were 
designed to assess general climate change beliefs (e.g., “I am certain that climate change 
is happening”). These 5 belief items, which served as our measure of climate change 
skepticism, were scored on 9-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) and 
coded such that higher scores indicate greater skepticism and less concern about climate 
change (M = 3.38, SD = 2.03, α = .93). As expected, scores on climate change skepticism 
were not influenced by the climate change framing (M = 3.42 in climate change 
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condition, M = 3.34 in control, t(209) = −.29, ns). At the end of the study, we also 
included a single item measure of political ideology (1 = very liberal, 6 = very 
conservative; M = 3.05, SD = 1.34). Conservatism and climate change skepticism were 
positively correlated, r(208) = .55. In addition, as exploratory measures, we included four 
other brief measures regarding climate change policies, attitudes about America’s 
contribution to climate change, identification with environmentalism, and perceived 
geographical distance of climate change effects. 
Table 1. Correlations between climate change skepticism, conservatism and donation-
related measures. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Climate 
Change 
Skepticism 
(1) 
1        
Conservatis
m (2) .55*** 1       
Donation 
Justificatio
ns 
Composite 
(3) 
.44*** .26*** 1      
Attitudes 
about 
Donating 
(4) 
−.34**
* −.17* 
−.67**
* 1     
Low 
Perceived 
Need (5) 
.42*** .18** .74*** −.72*** 1    
Donation 
Sufficiency 
(6) 
.31*** .12† .65*** −.47*** .42*** 1   
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Donation 
Impacts (7) .17** .08 .72*** 
−.51**
* .46*** .40*** 1  
Victim 
Blaming 
(8) 
.36*** .29*** .70*** −.28*** .37*** .20** 
.28**
* 1 
Low 
Victim 
Self-Help 
(9) 
.33*** .28*** .76*** −.40*** .44*** .23*** 
.38**
* .71*** 
Note. †p = .09. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Results 
The Effects of Disaster Framing on Beliefs about Disaster Cause 
We first tested whether framing the droughts and famine as the product of climate 
change significantly affected the degree to which participants attributed the disaster to 
human causes. Participants in the climate change condition (M = 4.19, SD = 1.54, n 
= 101) were significantly more likely to attribute the disaster to human causes, t(209) = 
−6.08, p < .001, 95% confidence interval (CI) = −1.59, −0.812, Cohen’s d = .83, than in 
the control condition (M = 2.99, SD = 1.33, n =110). As predicted, there was also a 
significant interaction between skepticism and condition (0 = control condition, 1 
= climate change condition) on perceptions of the disaster as human caused, controlling 
for political ideology (b = −.31, SE = 0.08, t = −3.68, p < .001, 95% CI = −0.475, 
−0.144). In the control condition, skepticism did not predict attributions of the disaster to 
human causes (b = −.10, SE = 0.06, ns). Conversely, skepticism was strongly associated 
with disaster attributions in the climate change condition, such that higher skepticism was 
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associated with lower belief that the disaster was attributable to human causes (b = 
−.41, SE = 0.07, t = −6.11, p < .001, 95% CI = −0.539, −0.276). 
The Impact of Disaster Framing on Donation Justifications 
Given our prediction that there would be an overall second-order motivated 
reasoning effect whereby linking the disaster to climate change would cause climate 
change skeptics to utilize any justification to withhold aid presented to them as a means 
of disengaging from the helping context, we opted to create a global composite of the five 
justification measures (perceived need, donation sufficiency, donation impacts, victim 
blaming, and perceived self-help). Combining these five scales together formed a reliable 
composite (M = 2.87, SD = 0.93, α = .76), with higher scores indicating greater 
justifications for withholding donations. 
However, to provide a thorough examination of this second-order motivated 
reasoning prediction, we also tested for the interaction between climate change 
skepticism and condition on each of the justification measures individually (see Table 2). 
Consistent with our hypothesis, in each case, we observed the predicted interaction 
pattern between climate change skepticism and disaster framing that mirrors the results of 
the full justifications composite. 
Table 2. The interaction between climate change skepticism and experimental condition 
on the individual donation justification measures. 
Variable b SE 
95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Lower Upper 
Low Perceived Need 
         Overall Interaction 
 
.17* 
 
.07 
 
.029 
 
.319 
         Climate Change Condition     .36*** .06 .245 .475 
         Control Condition     .19*** .06 .075 .298 
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Note. †p < .07. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
When examining the full composite, there was a significant interaction between 
climate change skepticism and condition (controlling for political ideology) on 
justifications to withhold aid, consistent with our predictions (b = .20, SE = 0.06, t = 
3.62, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.092, 0.310).1 In the climate change condition, climate change 
                                                          
1 When examined in isolation, political ideology (i.e., conservatism) showed a generally similar (though 
weaker) pattern as climate change skepticism. However, when controlling for climate change skepticism, 
there was no longer a coherent relationship between political ideology and the outcome measures. 
Conversely, the patterns for climate change skepticism were robust both when examined alone and when 
controlling for political ideology. 
Donation Sufficiency 
         Overall Interaction 
 
.18* 
 
.09 
 
.004 
 
.362 
         Climate Change Condition         .34*** .07 .195 478 
         Control Condition .15* .07 .016 .291 
Donation Impacts 
         Overall Interaction 
 
  .24** 
 
.09 
 
.058 
 
.426 
         Climate Change Condition     .26*** .07 .111 .403 
         Control Condition              .02 .07 −.126 .157 
Victim Blaming 
         Overall Interaction 
 
    .26*** 
 
.08 
 
.102 
 
.411 
         Climate Change Condition     .31*** .06 .190 .435 
         Control Condition              .06 .06 −.062 .174 
Low Victim Self-Help 
         Overall Interaction 
 
.15† 
 
.08 
 
−.008 
 
.308 
         Climate Change Condition      .24*** .07 .113 .364 
         Control Condition              .09 .06 −.033 .210 
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skepticism strongly predicted greater justifications for withholding aid (b = .30, SE = 
0.04, t = 6.84, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.214, 0.388). Skepticism also predicted greater 
justifications to withhold aid in the control condition, although to a lesser extent (b = 
.10, SE = 0.04, t = 2.35, p = .02, 95% CI = 0.016, 0.184). Figure 1 displays the interaction 
between skepticism and framing condition on the donation justifications composite. 
 
Figure 1. Donation justifications scores as a function of the interaction between climate 
change skepticism and experimental condition. 
As predicted, there was a significant effect for those high in skepticism when 
comparing the climate change condition and the control condition, with skeptics 
(+1 SD on skepticism) exhibiting more negative donation justification attitudes in the 
climate change condition (M = 3.54) than in the control condition (M = 3.02; b = 
.52, SE = 0.16, t = 3.27, p = .001, 95% CI = 0.207, 0.835). There was also a marginal 
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effect for those low in skepticism (−1 SD) in the opposite direction such that non-skeptics 
exhibited less negative justifications in the climate change condition (M = 2.31) than in 
the control condition (M = 2.61; b = −.30, SE = 0.16, t = −1.87, p = .063, 95% CI = 
−0.613, 0.017). 
Moderated Mediation Analysis 
Because past research has also outlined a link between the donation justification 
measures and actual attitudes about donating (Zagefka et al., 2012; Zagefka et al., 2011), 
we also tested whether the donation justifications would mediate the relationship between 
climate skepticism and participants’ attitudes toward donating to relief efforts. To 
examine this prediction, we conducted moderated mediation analyses with the donation 
justification composite as a mediator between climate change skepticism and attitudes 
about donating. We tested moderation of both the indirect path from skepticism through 
donation justifications and the direct path from skepticism to attitudes about donating by 
experimental condition (Hayes, 2013; model 8). 
Although recent methodological research on mediation (e.g., Hayes, 
2009; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010) indicates 
that it is not required for there to be a significant overall relationship between the IV and 
distal outcome variable (in this case, donation attitudes), from our second-order 
motivated reasoning perspective, we also anticipated there would be an interaction 
between climate change skepticism and experimental condition on attitudes about 
donating that would mirror the effects shown for donation justifications. Thus, we tested 
for the interaction of climate skepticism and framing condition on donation attitudes, 
controlling for political ideology. Consistent with the findings for the donation 
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justification measures, there was a significant interaction on attitudes about donating (b = 
−.17, SE = 0.08, t= −2.06, p = .041, 95% CI = −0.336, −0.007). In the climate change 
condition, greater climate change skepticism predicted less positive attitudes toward 
donating (b = −.32, SE = 0.07, t = −4.85, p < .001, 95% CI = −0.452, −0.191). There was 
also a weaker (but significant) relationship in the control condition (b = −.15, SE = 
0.06, t = −2.33, p = .021, 95% CI = −0.276, −0.023). Thus, climate change skepticism 
predicts donation attitudes, and this relationship is significantly stronger in the climate 
change framing condition than the natural drought condition. Therefore, next we tested 
whether this relationship was mediated by the justifications for/against providing aid. 
Using Hayes’ PROCESS macro for SPSS 22 (Model 8), we conducted a 
moderated mediation analysis testing moderation (by experimental condition) of both the 
direct and indirect paths (i.e., mediated by donation justifications) from skepticism to 
donation attitudes. As predicted, Hayes’ index of moderated mediation (which uses 
bootstrapping methods to test for moderated mediation, see Hayes, 2015) did not pass 
through zero (95% bootstrapped CIs (b = −.19, SEboot= 0.06, 95% CI = −0.316, −0.071). 
This test indicates that the strength of the indirect effect from skepticism to attitudes 
about donating through donation justifications was significantly different in the climate 
change and natural drought conditions. Follow-up examination of each of these 
conditional indirect effects indicates that there was a significant indirect effect of 
skepticism on donation attitudes through donation decision justifications for participants 
in the climate change condition (b = −.28, SEboot = 0.05, 95% CI = −0.393, −0.185, 95% 
CIs generated using 10,000 bootstrapped samples). There was also a significant indirect 
effect in the natural drought condition, although to a lesser extent (b = −.09, SEboot= .04, 
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95% CI = −0.181, −0.008). Furthermore, after accounting for the indirect (i.e., mediated) 
effects, there was no significant conditional direct effect in the control (b = −.06, SEb = 
0.05, ns) or the climate change condition (b= −.04, SEb = 0.06, ns).2 
Discussion 
The present research suggests that framing a disaster as caused by climate change 
can impact the degree to which individuals justify providing or withholding humanitarian 
support. Consistent with our second-order motivated reasoning hypothesis, participants 
high in climate change skepticism utilized greater justifications for withholding aid when 
the disaster was framed as climate change caused, which also had a negative effect on 
their attitudes toward donating to victims. These findings contribute to the growing 
literature on the role of motivated reasoning and ideology in the construal of scientific 
information and its effects on public policy (Kahan, 2013; Kahan et al., 2012; Roh, 
McComas, Rickard, & Decker, 2015). In particular, this study further extends the 
                                                          
2 As the donation justifications theoretically fall within two broader, though highly related, categories of 
victim-specific justifications (e.g., victim blaming) and aid effectiveness-related justifications (e.g., 
donation sufficiency), at the suggestion of a reviewer we also factor analyzed all of the justification items 
using principle axis factoring, an oblimin rotation, and selected a two-factor solution. Examination of the 
factor loadings supported this theoretical structure of these constructs. The items for victim blaming and 
perceived victim self-help loaded highly together on one factor, while the items for donation sufficiency 
and donation impacts loaded together on a separate factor. The 2 items measuring perceived need cross 
loaded and were therefore not included in further composites and analyses described subsequently. Two 
separate composites were formed based on this analysis, both of which were highly reliable (victim-specific 
justifications: α = .94, aid effectiveness-related justifications: α = .88) and correlated, r(209) = .37, p 
< .001. Using these composites, we tested an additional moderated mediation analysis (again controlling 
for political ideology) entering the two new composites together as mediators. In this analysis, the 
conditional direct effect of skepticism on willingness to donate retained significance in the climate change 
(b = −.13, SE = 0.06, p = .036) and the control condition (b = −.10, SE = 0.05, p = .05). When entered 
simultaneously, the conditional indirect effect of the aid effectiveness composite was significantly different 
in the climate change condition compared with the control condition, indicating significant moderated 
mediation for this variable (b = −.12, SEboot= 0.05, 95% CI = [−0.243, −0.032]). The index of moderated 
mediation for the victim-specific composite did not reach significance (b = −.03, SEboot = .02, 95% CI = 
[−0.098, 0.001]). 
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implications of ideologically motivated construal by providing novel evidence for a 
second order motivated reasoning effect. The biases one holds about a politicized issue 
such as climate change can affect perceptions and responses to the distal consequences of 
disaster events that are framed as connected with this politicized issue. 
As discussed previously, much of the literature on ideology and interpretation of 
scientific evidence has focused on how motivated reasoning processes affect the public’s 
interpretation of scientific evidence (e.g., Kahan et al., 2011; Kahan et al., 2012). In this 
context, motivated construal of the scientific information is directly related to one’s 
ideological beliefs (i.e., direct motivated reasoning effects). Our findings suggest that 
future work should also explore the potential for second order effects, whereby 
individuals construe information about world events differently depending on whether 
they are linked with a polarizing issue. This could possess significant implications for 
how scientific information about present and future risks is communicated to the public. 
It is rarely the case that the discussion of these issues in the media is free of ideological 
framings. Media speculation about climate change as the cause of recent natural disasters 
is commonplace. This is further exemplified in much of the recent dialogue regarding the 
ongoing (at the time of writing) droughts in California (e.g., Samenow, 2015). What our 
research suggests is that making this connection between the scientific evidence and a 
real disaster could have quite troublesome effects for how (certain) members of the 
public respond to these disasters. 
Given the real possibility that some ongoing and future disasters are/will be, in 
fact, related to climate change, understanding how individuals reason about these events 
and construe disaster-related information in light of their ideological beliefs seems 
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particularly pertinent. Future research, therefore, should extend the scope of inquiry 
beyond the effects of worldview biases on the construal of scientific information to also 
examine how linking this information with real disasters affects individuals’ responses to 
the victims of such events and their perceptions of future, related, disaster risks (e.g., 
likelihood of impending wildfires). 
This study also contributes to research on the psychology of charitable giving by 
indicating that disagreement over a heavily divided political issue can affect helping 
behaviors. The issue of polarization of relief efforts as a product of dimensions of the 
disasters themselves has been largely unexplored in the literature. In the most relevant 
preexisting research, Zagefka et al. (2011) found that people look at human-caused 
disasters differently than “natural” disasters. In their work, famine caused by war 
generally led to less support for donations than a famine caused by naturally occurring 
drought. The current research shows the influence of beliefs about climate change is also 
important when droughts are framed as being caused by climate change. For climate 
change skeptics, in particular, support for aid was lower when the drought was caused by 
climate change. Intriguingly, there was also some evidence of an opposite effect for those 
low in skepticism showing particularly low levels of justifications for withholding aid 
when the drought was described as being caused by climate change. Although the current 
study showed that the framing effect was stronger for climate change skeptics, future 
research should examine in more detail the ways in which climate change framings may 
impact climate change believers as well as skeptics. Outside of the work of Zagefka and 
colleagues, there is still little known about how the different causes of disasters and 
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related dimensions of ideology influence the donation decision process and this is an 
important topic for future research. 
These findings also possess implications for media portrayals of disaster events, 
particularly when large amounts of external public donations are required to respond to 
these events. These data suggest that organizations appealing for aid (and media outlets 
reporting on natural disasters) should be cautious of blending aid appeals with the 
discussion of contentious ideological topics, as it could result in an unintended backlash 
against the disaster victims. While our findings indicate that framing a natural disaster as 
the product of climate change may affect donations, future research should build on these 
findings by testing them in the context of future disasters as they unfold. 
Although the scientific evidence about the role of human activity in causing 
climate change has reached consensus, there remains great uncertainty about the role of 
climate change in any specific weather event and even longer term patterns such as 
recurring drought. This inherent uncertainty means that many, if not all, events that may 
be caused by climate change will be subject to debate and divergent interpretations. As 
the current work shows, these interpretations and divergent perspectives may even affect 
people’s perceptions of the victims of disaster events via motivated reasoning processes. 
Bayesian Re-Analysis of Focal Models 
Following publication, I re-evaluated the central results using a Bayesian 
estimation approach in order to generate full posterior distributions of estimates and 
inform future investigations. I re-estimated the two focal interaction models, one for the 
full negative justifications composite and the other for donation attitudes. The technical 
details of the model specifications and priors can be found in Appendix B. Stated 
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succinctly, the models were fit using weakly informative prior distributions on the 
regression coefficients and residual standard deviation, and the non-dummy coded 
predictors were standardized (M = 0, SD = 1). Figures 2 through 5 provide graphical 
depictions of the interactions and full posterior distributions. These results are highly 
consistent with those reported in the original analysis. However, model comparisons also 
shed additional light on strength of evidence accumulated.  
In terms of predicting justifications for withholding aid to victims, the posterior 
median of the interaction term was .41, 95% HPDI = .18, .62. Figure 2 provides a 
graphical decomposition of the interaction (see Figure 3 for full posterior distributions). 
Using a Bayesian implementation of the R-squared statistic, this model accounted for 
roughly 25%, 95% HPDI = 16, 33 of the variance. However, when performing model 
comparison via LOO IC, the model including the interaction term was not considerably 
better than a model without the term (LOO IC difference = -11.15, SE = 8.12). This focus 
on out-of-sample predictive performance highlights that, while theoretically informative, 
the interaction effect observed may be of limited importance for improving prediction. 
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However, additional research with an explicit focus on performance will help provide 
better clarity in this regard.  
Figure 2. Effect of article condition and skepticism on negative justifications for 
donating. Results come from a Bayesian regression model. Lines represent posterior 
slopes in each condition. Shaded intervals are 95% fitted regression intervals.   
 
For the donation attitudes outcome measure, the interaction model accounted for 
roughly 14% [.07, .22] of the variance. Figure 4 displays the decomposition of the 
interaction, and figure 5 displays the posterior distributions. In this model, the variability 
in the interaction estimate was considerable (Posterior Median = -.35, 95% HPDIs = [-
.67, < .01]). Values at or above zero cannot be fully ruled out for this estimate, although 
more than 90% of the posterior probability was below zero. 
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Figure 3. Posterior distributions of model predictive negative justifications. Full posterior 
distributions from Bayesian linear regression model. Vertical blue lines represent 
posterior medians and shaded intervals represent 50% posterior intervals. 
 
When comparing the interaction model to a model removing the interaction term, 
LOO IC comparison suggested nearly indistinguishable predictive capacity for these two 
models (LOO IC difference = -2.21, SE = 4.51). Thus, while the interaction on 
willingness to donate met conventional standards of statistical significance from a 
frequentist perspective, a Bayesian re-analysis suggests both greater uncertainty and 
limited gains in terms of prediction. 
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Figure 4. Effect of article condition and skepticism on willingness to donate.Results come 
from a Bayesian regression model. Lines represent posterior slopes in each condition. 
Shaded intervals are 95% fitted regression intervals. 
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Figure 5. Posterior distributions of model predictive donation attitudes. Full posterior 
distributions from Bayesian linear regression model. Vertical blue lines represent 
posterior medians and shaded intervals represent 50% posterior intervals. 
 
Bridge to Chapter 3 
Since the initial publication of this work, other research teams have arrived at 
related conclusions using different approaches and contexts. Hine et al. (2016), for 
example, found that Australians dismissive of climate change as a public risk were more 
receptive to messages encouraging adaptation behaviors when climate change was not 
explicitly mentioned. Perhaps even more central is recent work by Kahan et al (2017). In 
their study, linking the Zika virus explicitly with either climate change or illegal 
immigration produced polarized public judgments of the risk of Zika along ideological 
lines. Stated differently, those on both the left and the right end of the ideological 
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spectrum engaged in identity-protective measures when faced with explanations for a 
public risk that were not in accordance with their predominant worldview. This work 
provides an interesting complement to the study discussed in Chapter 2. However, future 
work should continue to follow up on these findings and better understand their 
ecological validity and importance for public engagement. 
Clearly, making explicit attributions to climate change is capable of activating 
ICT processes that generalize to other domains. In particular, Chapter 2 documented the 
pervasive influence of motivated reasoning when it interacts with firm ideological 
positions such as climate change skepticism. When considering Chapter 2 in conjunction 
with Kahan et al. (2017) and Hine et al. (2016), it is also clear that these types of ICT 
processes are not constrained to a particular ideological position. Those on both ends of 
the ideological spectrum holding a variety of different issue-specific attitudes may utilize 
ICT for different purposes. However, I would express caution about over-interpreting the 
results to date on this issue. For one, the research described has not been validated with 
ecologically-valid behavioral outcomes, and instead relies on self-reported attitudes and 
intentions. Further, the Bayesian model comparisons suggest that the interaction effect 
may not necessarily improve our capacity to predict donation attitudes or negative 
justifications. Future work should follow up these investigations with an emphasis on 
both of these issues. 
Whereas the work in Chapter 2 focused on motivated reasoning using an 
experimental paradigm in relation to climate change attitudes and political identity, 
Chapter 3 shifts directions to examine how strongly held social identities influence 
judgments of responsibility and action intentions following a personally-relevant 
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environmental scandal. The work in Chapter 3 compliments the findings of Chapter 2 by 
exploring how multiple, potentially intertwined, social identities unrelated to climate 
change bias influence responses to environmental problems. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERACTIVE IDENTITIES AND THE VOLKSWAGEN SCANDAL 
 
Introduction 
In September 2015, the Volkswagen Group (VW) admitted to intentionally 
programming the onboard software of their turbocharged direct injection (TDI) diesel 
vehicles to circumvent emissions regulations. This so-called “defeat device” results in 
nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions during vehicle use that significantly exceed regulatory 
limits imposed in the United States and many other countries. An estimated 500,000 
vehicles operating in the United States and 11 million globally currently have the device 
installed, contributing to increases in global NOx emissions (Gates, Ewing, Russel, & 
Watkins, 2016). VW’s intentional circumvention of emissions regulations is likely to 
have significant health and environmental impacts, including increased smog (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, 1999), exacerbation of respiratory illnesses, and 
premature deaths (Barrett et al., 2016). 
Perhaps less salient are impacts and implications of the scandal for the owners of 
affected vehicles. These include not only likely financial losses due to rapid depreciation 
of affected vehicles but also psychological and social impacts that can come along with 
being associated—fairly or not—with a harmful product, brand or identity (Trump, 
2014). Moreover, the scandal places owners in a difficult situation regarding what to do 
with their vehicles that pit competing priorities and values against one another, including 
vehicle performance, cost, and environmental impact. These decisions will impact not 
only owners themselves but also their neighbors and others more broadly, given the 
negative impacts of NOx emissions. Thus, the current emissions problem is an interesting 
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and challenging example of a social dilemma (Fudenberg, Rand, & Dreber, 2012; Rand, 
Arbesman, & Christakis, 2011; Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009). 
While ascribing responsibility to VW for misconduct is certainly warranted in this 
case, research demonstrates that a vital factor in motivating individual responses to social 
dilemmas is feeling a degree of personal responsibility for taking action (Iyengar, 1989; 
Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013; Weiner, 2006). Existing literature on 
ascriptions of responsibility for causing and responding to environmental and public 
health problems is fairly limited, however, particularly research that concurrently 
examines how perceived responsibility both for causing and for responding to a problem 
influences behavior (Jang, 2013; Rickard, Yang, Seo, & Harrison, 2014; Yang, Seo, 
Rickard, & Harrison, 2015). Understanding whether and why owners ascribe personal 
responsibility for contributing to and solving the emissions problem is thus critical for 
supporting effective owner-driven responses. 
We report findings from research conducted with owners of affected VW TDI 
vehicles in the United States in which we investigate one potentially powerful, yet 
complex, driver of both perceived responsibility and behavioral intentions: social 
identity. Drawing on research from psychology, marketing, and behavioral economics, 
we explore how the interaction of multiple contextually activated identities, i.e., 
environmental and brand identification, influences ascriptions of responsibility for 
contributing to the emissions problem and for repairing impacted vehicles, and how these 
perceptions influence intentions to fix vehicles in spite of potential personal costs of 
doing so.  
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Research indicates that the groups and causes people identify with powerfully 
shape how they interpret and respond to events related to those identities (Clayton & 
Opotow, 2003; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Social identity processes may be important for 
collective action problems specifically because they can influence ascriptions of 
responsibility for responding to large-scale problems with diffuse causes and solutions. 
This should particularly be the case when the event, e.g., the VW emissions scandal, is 
linked to a relevant social identity with which a person strongly identifies (e.g., 
“environmentalist”, “VW TDI owner”). Being strongly identified with a group or identity 
implicated in an event often predicts polarized cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
responses (Brown, 2000). However, the strength and direction of that polarization, e.g., 
feeling increased personal responsibility versus denying responsibility, may be shaped by 
contextual factors and other relevant social identities that are concurrently activated 
(Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigholdus, & 
Gordijn, 2003; Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2005).  
In the context of the VW emissions scandal, two social identities appear 
particularly relevant: identifying with the brand and vehicle type (e.g., VW TDI owner) 
and identifying as an environmentalist. Stronger identification with a brand is associated 
with greater loyalty, positive “word of mouth”, and repurchasing behaviors (Ahearne, 
Bhattacharya, & Thomas, 2005; Ashforth, Harrison & Corley, 2008; Bhattachrya & Sen, 
2003; Hughes & Ahearne, 2010; Kuenzel & Halliday, 2008). However, little work has 
examined how transgressions by brands influence the personal behaviors of those highly 
identified with the brand (He, Li, & Harris, 2012). Most research has focused on how 
brand transgressions influence individuals’ perceptions of the brand itself (Aacker, 
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Fournier, & Brasel, 2004; Cheng, White, & Chaplin, 2012; Einwiller, Fedorikhin, 
Johnson, & Kamins, 2006), and not whether high identification with a brand may result 
in a greater sense of personal responsibility for the brand’s actions.  
Environmental identity, a form of social identity involving a sense of attachment 
to the natural world and greater perceived self-relevance of issues affecting the 
environment, is a strong predictor of responses to environmental issues (Clayton, 2003, 
2012), including discrete crises (e.g., the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill; Clayton, 
Koehn, & Grover, 2013), conflicts over resources (Colvin, Witt, & Lacey, 2015), and 
attitudes about climate change (Fielding & Hornsey, 2016). Greater environmental 
identity is associated with greater perceptions of harm from environmental disasters and 
greater characterizations of such disasters as injustices (Clayton et al., 2013). 
One of the appeals of the VW TDI vehicles was the proclaimed combination of 
superior vehicle performance, low environmental impact and efficient fuel economy. The 
marketing of the vehicles as “clean diesel”—environmentally friendly and performance-
oriented—likely made the car appealing to both environmentally conscious consumers 
and VW/Diesel enthusiasts seeking a more fuel-efficient, high performance vehicle. 
Thus, the community of VW TDI owners likely includes individuals who identify 
strongly as environmentalists, individuals who identify with the brand and vehicle type, 
and individuals who strongly self-associate with both of these identities.  
Here we report findings from research conducted with 300 U.S. owners of 
affected VW TDI vehicles after news of the scandal broke in Fall 2015 and before VW 
and regulators released details of a potential mitigation plan. We expected that being 
highly identified as a VW/diesel owner may have different implications for one’s 
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responses to the scandal depending on whether one has a strong versus weak 
environmental identity. We hypothesized that there would be an interactive relationship 
between holding environmentalist and VW/Diesel brand identities, such that VW/diesel 
ownership identification would be predictive of intentions to fix one’s vehicle only 
amongst high environmental identifiers. Thus, we expected that the strength of 
brand/diesel owner identification would predict attributions of personal responsibility 
both for causing and solving the emissions problem, but only amongst those who are also 
strongly identified as environmentalists. 
Methods 
Participants 
Owners in the United States of affected TDI vehicles manufactured between 2009 
and 2016 by the Volkswagen Group (Volkswagen, Audi, Porsche) were recruited by 
Qualtrics.com through multiple panels. This sample was recruited from January through 
March of 2016, prior to the announcement of any settlement agreements between 
Volkswagen and the U.S. government regarding vehicles. Thus, we assessed affected 
owners’ responses to the emissions scandal and their intended responses regarding their 
vehicles prior to any announced plan from the company or government agencies. All 
participants consented to participate through an online consent form and the study was 
approved by the University of Massachusetts Amherst Institutional Review Board 
(Protocol ID: 2015-2808).  
Due to the specificity of the sample, we aimed to recruit as many affected VW 
owners as possible under our budget and a three month time frame. As such, our data 
collection stopping rule was determined by financial considerations and the amount of 
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time required for collecting data from this specialized sample. Data collection was 
stopped when Qualtrics.com obtained completed surveys from 300 participants (Mage = 
37.34, SD = 13.07, Minimum = 18, Maximum = 85). More females (n =173) than males (n 
= 127) participated, and a majority reported household incomes ranging from $35,001 to 
$100,000 USD (n = 178), while 38 respondents reported $35,000 or less and 63 reported 
household incomes greater than $100,000 in 2015 (non-disclosure: n = 21).  Participants 
primarily identified as white/Caucasian (n = 216), with smaller numbers of African 
Americans (n = 23), Hispanics (n = 20), Asians (n = 20), and Native Americans (n = 3) 
also participating (3 reported “other”; Non-disclosure: n = 15). Forty-three of the 50 U.S. 
states were represented, with larger groupings of participants (n’s > 15) residing in 
California (n = 31), New York (n = 25), Texas (n = 20), Pennsylvania (n = 19), Florida (n 
= 18), and Georgia (n = 15). A larger portion of our sample identified as Democrats (n = 
120) than as Independents (n = 91) or Republicans (n = 78), while 11 identified as 
“other”. When asked to rate their political identification ranging from liberal to 
conservative (1 = Very liberal, 4 = Moderate, 7 = Very conservative), the majority 
identified as moderates (n = 103), and the sample overall was very slightly to the left on 
the political spectrum (M =3.72, SD = 1.65). 
In addition to basic demographic characteristics, specific vehicle-related 
demographics were also collected. The majority of the sample owned/leased a 
Volkswagen TDI vehicle (n = 239), followed by Audi TDI vehicles (n = 53), and Porsche 
(n = 8; Cayenne S, Diesel engine model only), ranging all eligible years (2009-2016). 
Our sample primarily consisted of vehicle owners (n = 278; lessees: n = 22) who were 
the primary driver of their vehicle (n = 291). Length of ownership of their current vehicle 
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ranged from less than 6 months up to 7 years, and for the majority of participants this was 
their first TDI engine vehicle (n = 241). As the Volkswagen Group had already begun 
issuing $500 in dealer credits and $500 prepaid Visa Debit Cards to some impacted 
owners at the time of the study, we also assessed whether participants had applied to 
receive any of these credits yet, and the majority had not (Not Received: n = 189, 
Received: n = 85, Not Sure: n = 25, Non-disclosure: n = 1). 
Measures 
After consenting to participate, participants were presented with a battery of items 
related to how they are perceiving (e.g., judgments of responsibility) and responding 
(e.g., where they have been receiving information and communicated about the scandal) 
to the scandal, their social identities, and their intended responses regarding their 
vehicles. The measures and results reported here only contain those pertaining to our 
hypotheses about social identity and ascriptions of personal responsibility. However, 
other measures were also included for exploratory purposes, for other unrelated 
hypotheses, and to inform future research questions, such as perceived self-knowledge 
and information acquisition, communication behaviors, concerns about reputation, 
perceptions of “clean diesel” technology, and trust in Volkswagen and government 
regulators. Information regarding these items can be provided by the authors upon 
request, and descriptive results of these measures can be found in Markowitz, Chapman, 
Guckian, & Lickel (2017). 
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Environmental and ownership identity 
Three items assessed the extent to which each of the following characteristics 
were important to their sense of who they are as a person: environmentalists (M = 4.49, 
SD = 1.75), diesel-vehicle owners (M = 3.37, SD = 1.85), and owners of 
Volkswagen/Audi/Porsche vehicles (M = 3.69, SD = 1.96; 1 = not at all important, 7 = 
extremely important). All three identity items were positively correlated (r’s > .3). Due to 
a high degree of association between diesel and ownership identity, these two items were 
averaged together to create a single ownership composite measure that was used in all 
analyses (M = 3.53, SD = 1.77, r = .735). In addition, we also assessed their sense of 
social identity on other categories unrelated to the current analyses, such as the extent to 
which they identify as an American, as a team-player, and as a general car enthusiast. 
Perceived personal responsibility 
One item assessed the extent to which participants felt a sense of responsibility 
for contributing to the emission situation (M = 2.32, SD = 1.87; 1 = not at all responsible, 
7 = extremely responsible).  Participants rated the extent to which they felt a sense of 
personal responsibility for repairing impacted vehicles using a single item (M = 3.16, SD 
= 2.05; 1 = not at all responsible, 7 = extremely responsible). These questions were asked 
alongside a series of other targets of responsibility for exploratory purposes not reported 
here, including government regulators, VW, and other affected owners. 
Intentions to fix affected vehicles 
A single item measured participants’ intentions to repair their affected vehicle 
once an approved repair is released (M = 5.58, SD = 1.66, 1 = extremely unlikely, 4 = 
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undecided, 7 = extremely likely; for more descriptive information on this measure, see 
Markowitz et al., 2017). A separate categorical item measured the timing at which they 
would repair their vehicle if the repair process were implemented, with responses ranging 
from “I wouldn’t get my car fixed” (1) to “I would be the first in line to get my vehicle 
fixed” (5). The mean score for this item was 3.59 (SD = 1.22), indicating that participants 
on average fell between the ranking of “I would wait a month or so” (3) and “I would 
wait a couple of weeks” (4). 
Results 
Table 3 displays the correlations between each of the measures used to test the 
hypotheses. Greater environmental identity was correlated with greater ascriptions of 
personal responsibility for contributing to the emissions problem and for fixing impacted 
vehicles. Environmental identity was positively associated with intentions to fix affected 
vehicles and motives to repair vehicles as soon as a fix becomes available. VW/Diesel 
identity and environmental identity were positively correlated, consistent with our 
proposition that the multiple identities VW owners may hold are not mutually exclusive 
or inherently oppositional. VW/Diesel identity was positively correlated with perceptions 
of responsibility for the cause and for fixing vehicles, but was not itself correlated with 
intentions to fix vehicles. 
Table 3. Bivariate correlations between independent and dependent study measures. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Environmental Identity (1) 1      
VW/Diesel Identity (2) .44*** 1     
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Personal Responsibility for 
Emissions Problem (3) .28*** .40*** 1    
Personal Responsibility for 
Fixing affected Vehicles (4) .31*** .29*** .62*** 1   
Intentions to Fix Impacted 
Vehicles (5) .18** .09 .11* .22*** 1  
Intended Timing of Getting 
Fix (6) .19*** .03 .09 .26*** .53*** 1 
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
Perceived Responsibility for Contributing and for Fixing Affected Vehicles 
Bayesian linear regression models were fit to examine the effects of VW/Diesel 
identity, environmental identity, and their interaction, on judgments of personal 
responsibility for contributing to the scandal. Prior specifications and model details are 
provided in Appendix B. After standardizing the predictors (M = 0, SD = 1), there was a 
moderately strong impact of VW/Diesel identity on judgments of personal responsibility 
for contributing to the scandal, Posterior Median = .56, 95% HPDI = .34, .78. The effect 
of environmental identity was nearly half the size of the VW/Diesel effect, but also had a 
positive influence, Posterior Median = .30, 95% HPDI = .09, .51. These two main effects 
were qualified by a positive interaction effect, leading to roughly a .3 unit increase in 
responsibility judgments, Posterior Median = .34, 95% HPDI = .14, .53. Figure 6 plots 
the interaction effect and Figure 7 displays the full posterior distributions of key model 
parameters. The interaction decomposition indicates that as VW/Diesel identity 
increased, judgments of personal responsibility increased, specifically for those also 
higher in environmental identity. Overall, the model accounted for roughly 21% [14, 28] 
of the variance. 
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Figure 6. VW/diesel and environmental identity interaction: responsibility for 
contributing. Results come from a Bayesian regression model. Predictors were 
standardized for the analysis. Blue, green, and red lines thus represent -1 SD, the mean, 
and +1 SD, respectively. Shaded intervals are 95% fitted regression intervals. 
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 Figure 7. Posterior distributions of model predicting responsibility for contributing to 
scandal. Full posterior distributions from Bayesian linear regression model. Vertical blue 
lines represent posterior medians and shaded intervals represent 50% posterior intervals. 
 
Judgments of personal responsibility for fixing affected vehicles was modelled in 
the same way as the previous analysis. Figures 8 and 9 provide the full posterior 
distributions for the model, which accounted for roughly 14%, (95% posterior interval = 
.8, 21) of the variance. However, the nature of the model effects were slightly different 
than the previously described model. In this case environmental identity was a stronger 
predictor (Posterior Median = .50, 95% HPDI = .26, .74) than VW/Diesel identity 
(Posterior Median = .34, 95% HPDI = .10, .59). The interaction effect was also 
noticeably weaker in magnitude, Posterior Median = .23, 95% HPDI = .02, .44. 
Examining the plotted interaction effect highlights the similarity of effects between this 
analysis and the prior analysis, although a recognition of the magnitude and uncertainty 
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in the estimates are especially warranted in this case.
 
Figure 8. VW/diesel and environmental identity interaction: responsibility for fixing 
affected vehicle.Results come from a Bayesian regression model. Predictors were 
standardized for the analysis. Blue, green, and red lines thus represent -1 SD, the mean, 
and +1 SD, respectively. Shaded intervals are 95% fitted regression intervals. 
Given the underlying conceptual similarity between these two items, I also 
analyzed a composite measure by taking the average of these two measures to evaluate 
the aggregated interaction estimate. Figures 10 and 11 again provide the posterior 
distributions and interaction plot. The model accounted for roughly 20% of the variance 
(95% posterior interval = 13, 28) and yielded similar effects to the earlier models. The 
overall estimate of the interaction effect was positive, although still with considerable 
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variation, Posterior Median = .28, 95% HPDI = .10, .46. VW/Diesel Identity (Posterior 
Median = .46, 95% HPDI = .25, .66) and environmental identity (Posterior Median = .40, 
95% HPDI = .21, .61) both had positive, stronger effects. 
 
Figure 9. Posterior distributions of model predicting responsibility for fixing vehicle. Full 
posterior distributions from Bayesian linear regression model. Vertical blue lines 
represent posterior medians and shaded intervals represent 50% posterior intervals. 
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Figure 10. VW/diesel and environmental identity interaction: responsibility for 
composite. Results come from a Bayesian regression model. Predictors were standardized 
for the analysis. Blue, green, and red lines thus represent -1 SD, the mean, and +1 SD, 
respectively. Shaded intervals are 95% fitted regression intervals. 
Fix Intentions and Speed to Fix Affected Vehicles 
Intentions to fix one’s vehicle was modelled using the same specifications as the 
analyses described above. As can be seen from the posterior distributions and interaction 
plot (see figures 12 and 13), there was little evidence to suggest a robust interaction effect 
on this measure, Posterior Median = .07, 95% HPDI = -.12, .26, and the estimated 
Bayesian R-squared was roughly 4% (95% posterior interval = 1%, 9%). The posterior 
distribution for VW/Diesel identity was centered squarely at zero (Posterior Median < 
 65 
.01, 95% HPDI = -.20, .21), whereas environmental identity had a positive effect similar 
to what was observed for other outcome measures, Posterior Median = .30, 95% HPDI = 
.09, .51. 
Figure 11. Posterior distributions of model predicting composite responsibility measure. 
Full posterior distributions from Bayesian linear regression model. Vertical blue lines 
represent posterior medians and shaded intervals represent 50% posterior intervals.  
Finally, the measure of intended fix timing was analyzed using an ordinal logit 
regression model with flexible category thresholds. As this item was conceptualized as an 
ordinal measure with discrete outcomes categories, ordinal regression is an appropriate 
alternative to traditional linear regression. However, the Bayesian R-squared 
implementation is not computed for ordinal models, as the residuals are not defined in 
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these models. Figure 14 provides the graphical depictions of the posterior distributions. 
Prior specification and model details can be found in Appendix B.  
Figure 12. VW/diesel and environmental identity interaction: intentions to fix 
vehicle.Results come from a Bayesian regression model. Predictors were standardized for 
the analysis. Blue, green, and red lines thus represent -1 SD, the mean, and +1 SD, 
respectively. Shaded intervals are 95% fitted regression intervals. 
The interaction was again positive, Posterior Median = .23, 95% HPDI = .02, .44, 
Odds Ratio = 1.26, although as with prior analyses the uncertainty in the estimate was 
close to a half-scale point on the outcome scale. And, the odds ratio depicting the change 
in proportional odds was less than 2. The effect of VW/Diesel identity was primarily 
negative, although there was a small portion of the posterior probability at or above zero, 
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Posterior Median = -.19, 95% HPDI = -.43, .03, Odds Ratio = 0.83. In contrast, there was 
a positive effect of environmental identity on intended fix timing, Posterior Median = 
.49, 95% HPDI = .24, .72, Odds Ratio = 1.63. Comparing the interaction model to a 
model not including the interaction term yielded little support for changes in or added 
predictive capacity of including the interaction term (LOO IC difference = -3.02, SE = 
4.52). 
Figure 13. Posterior distributions of model predicting intentions to fix affected vehicle. 
Full posterior distributions from Bayesian linear regression model. Vertical blue lines 
represent posterior medians and shaded intervals represent 50% posterior intervals. 
Discussion 
We examined how contextually salient social identities influence ascriptions of 
personal responsibility for contributing and responding to a previously unanticipated 
collective action problem, i.e., excessive vehicle emissions, imposed by the actions of a 
 68 
third party. Greater VW/Diesel ownership identification predicted greater ascriptions of 
personal responsibility for contributing and responding to the emissions problem 
particularly among owners who were also high in environmental identification. Greater 
environmental identification only very modestly buffered the negative effect of 
VW/Diesel ownership identification on the speed with which individuals intend to fix 
their vehicles once a fix is available. Consistent with our expectation that ascriptions of 
personal responsibility would be a key determinant of intentions to fix one’s vehicle, 
among participants high in environmental identification, greater VW/Diesel identity 
resulted in greater ascriptions of personal responsibility for causing the scandal and 
subsequent ascriptions of responsibility for fixing affected vehicles.  
Past research on social identity has largely focused on the direct, simple effects of 
particular identities on behavior. The present findings reveal how multiple social 
identities may interact to amplify or reduce the effects of particular identities on decision-
making. These results are among the first that we are aware of to examine how such 
interactions affect responses to collective action problems and environmental 
wrongdoing. This may have implications for collective action and public goods dilemmas 
because such situations likely activate multiple identities, each of which may engender 
unique motives but which may also operate interactively to influence how people frame 
and respond to the problem. However, evaluation of the Bayesian posterior estimates, as 
well as out-of-sample predictive capacity using LOO IC suggested both considerable 
uncertainty in these estimates and a portion of un-modelled variance. Furthermore, the 
posterior probability of the interaction terms in the models of actual fix intentions and fix 
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timing had more of their posterior probability centered around zero than the other models, 
suggesting less support for direct effects of the interaction on these outcomes. 
Figure 14. Posterior distributions of model predicting intended fix timing. Full posterior 
distributions from Bayesian ordinal logit regression model using flexible category 
thresholds. Coefficients are on the log scale. Vertical blue lines represent posterior 
medians and shaded intervals represent 50% posterior intervals. 
It is important to note that the research described here was conducted prior to any 
details were public about the proposed (and now finalized) settlements between VW and 
U.S. regulators, and before the majority of vehicle owners had taken actions with their 
vehicles. Through the settlement agreement, the company is ascribed legal responsibility 
and is required to pay substantial monetary fines (Volkswagen Group of America, 2016). 
The initial settlement (October 2016) for 2.0-litre vehicles, includes a $10 billion 
buyback program where eligible TDI owners are able to sell back their vehicles to VW at 
pre-scandal values depending on model, age, trim and region. The company also bears 
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responsibility for repairing vehicles of owners who instead opt for an approved fix. Each 
of the three generations of 2.0-litre vehicles require different, and potentially 
performance-undermining retrofits, while one generation has been approved for resale by 
U.S. regulators. A second settlement for 3.0-liter diesel models was reached in May 2017, 
differing substantially from the 2-liter agreement, provided VW cannot repair the 3.0-litre 
vehicles to be emissions compliant (Atiyeh, 2017). 
A potentially problematic aspect of these agreements is that there is nothing at 
this point that requires compliance from owners; the company has until June 30, 2019 to 
buy back 85 percent of all vehicles, though it is not clear from the agreements whether 
owners will be obligated to obtain an available fix should they opt to not participate in the 
buyback. Given the varying emissions standards between states, the uncertainty regarding 
what the legal mandates will be, and the low likelihood of detecting unfixed vehicles, it is 
possible that some owners may leave their vehicles unfixed, even if a relatively “cost-
free” solution is available. Thus, understanding what motivates individual-level action in 
response to this problem, especially when there is the potential for personal losses from 
cooperating, is critical. 
A strength of the research reported here is that this was conducted in the 
immediate aftermath of a real-world social dilemma and carried out with stakeholders 
directly affected by the scandal. Thus, while correlational, we are hopeful that this 
research provides a temporal barometer on how multiple social identities influence how 
individuals form appraisals of responsibility, and ultimately, potentially make decisions 
about how to respond to such scandals. It is our opinion that future research on how 
social identities influence decision-making processes would greatly benefit by further 
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investigations that maximize ecological validity, take advantage of rapid-onset scandals 
and collective goods dilemmas such as this, and attempt to speak to real-time decision 
processes as best as possible.  
Nevertheless, this research is not without its limitations. In particular, this 
research is correlational in nature, and thus strong inferences with regard to causality are 
not permitted. However, our models stemmed from extensive past research on social 
identity and judgments of responsibility, adopting a similar approach and methodology to 
other research in this domain. Future research would nevertheless substantially benefit 
from multi-method approaches, including more controlled experiments and qualitative 
research with affect owners. Furthermore, due to time, space, and budgetary constraints, 
the measures reported here were developed to be short, face-valid measures of our 
constructs. While demonstrating modestly acceptable psychometric properties for what 
we were able to accomplish, greater precision and granularity of measurement would be 
desirable in future investigations. 
The findings reported here suggest one potentially powerful yet low-cost 
approach to promoting effective owner responses to the emissions problem: tailor 
outreach efforts to activate environmental concerns and the multiple social identities held 
by many VW owners. In some ways, the original branding of these vehicles as both 
environmentally friendly and performance oriented may be a blessing in disguise: having 
owners reflect on these characteristics of their original purchasing decisions may help 
promote effective environmentally- and public health-friendly responses to the emissions 
problem. 
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Bridge to Chapter 4 
Chapter 3 discussed a novel investigation into the influence of multiple social 
identities activated in the context of an ongoing corporate scandal with environmental 
consequences. Perhaps one the most interesting implications of this work is the finding 
that taking steps to emphasize or make salient a relevant social identity (e.g., 
environmental identity) may help motivate faster responses to scandals that strike at the 
heart of that identity. And, in terms of explaining motivations to change personal 
behavior to address the scandal, environmental identity produced more positive outcomes 
than VW/Diesel identity. There was only minimal support for the proposed interaction 
effects in this models. Evidence for an interactive effect of these identities was most 
pronounced in the context of judgments of personal responsibility, but were less 
consequential for actual response intentions. This is perhaps due in part to the number of 
decision factors that might influence fix responses which were not modelled directly in 
this study (e.g., potential fix causes, proximity to locations to get vehicles fixed, 
knowledge of what will and will not be covered financially by VW). While such 
interactions are by their nature interesting in thinking through theoretical questions, it 
remains unclear whether such ICT processes may lead to actual behavior change based 
on these data. Future research should take a more deliberate, careful approach in 
modelling the behavioral outcomes of such studies. 
While this research did not directly examine ICT using more traditional measures 
and approaches, the findings presented carry interesting implications for this work 
moving forward. For example, these findings suggest that certain individuals are willing 
to ascribe themselves varying degrees of personal responsibility for a real-world scandal 
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they did not directly cause, even when this response may lead to personally costly 
outcomes. While such motivated identity processes are typically treated as a negative 
process in public engagement (and often to carry negative implications), it is also evident 
that certain identities, such as environmental identity, may lead some individuals to be 
more motivated to respond in positive ways. Given such a finding, it is important to 
reconsider the extent to which these findings are evidence for cognition that is 
specifically identity protective, as opposed to stemming from other possible motives. 
Given the measurements available and the correlational nature of these data, it is difficult 
to disentangle respondents’ motivations in this regard. Yet, relative to those with higher 
environmental identity, those with greater VW/Diesel brand identity were less motivated 
to respond by fixing their vehicles. As these multiple identities may be contextually 
activated within the same individual at a given time, it is as of yet unclear how ICT 
processes are influenced by which (and how many) relevant identities are activated.  
While much of the literature on ICT, and indeed on climate change attitudes more 
broadly, is carried out using text-heavy materials (e.g., randomly showing participants 
one versus another news article), little research has explored these phenomena in the 
context of responses to visual imagery. While an interesting methodological change in its 
own right, this also raises theoretical questions. For example, do individuals respond 
similarly to images of climate change as they do to text-based mediums? And, do 
different types of climate change imagery provoke stronger types of affective reactions 
and pro-climate change emotions, and does this vary depending on the worldview beliefs 
of respondents? Chapter 4 investigates these questions and others through a mixed-
methods, cross-national investigation of responses to climate change imagery. In addition 
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to the descriptive results in the main body of Chapter 4, the addendum provides more 
comprehensive Bayesian hierarchical modelling to address the questions specifically 
related to cultural worldviews and responses to climate change imagery.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE IMAGERY 
 
Introduction 
Over the past decade there has been a proliferation of academic research and 
practitioner literature that has sought to address the question of how to more effectively 
communicate climate change (e.g., CRED & ecoAmerica, 2014; Van der Linden et al., 
2015b). However, although much is now understood about public engagement with 
climate change, the vast majority of climate communication studies have focused on 
verbal communication. Climate change is a particularly difficult issue to communicate, 
let alone visualize. The widespread perception of climate change as an abstract, distant, 
and uncertain phenomenon presents it as a uniquely complex problem for motivating 
individual and group-level engagement (Gifford, 2011; Markowitz and Shariff, 2012). 
But despite the fact that thousands of climate change images are shared by journalists, 
campaigners and educators around the world on a daily basis, little research has focused 
on how to more effectively communicate climate change in the visual medium. 
The lack of past research on visual imagery and climate communication is both 
puzzling and problematic. A wide diversity of images are used to depict climate 
change—from pictures of smokestacks and traffic jams (highlighting causes of climate 
change) to iconic images of polar bears on isolated patches of ice (focusing attention on 
potential impacts) to photos of people installing photovoltaics on their roofs (showing 
possible solutions to the problem). Yet despite the crucial role of climate imagery in 
shaping how people conceptualize the issue of climate change (Leiserowitz, 2006), non-
governmental organizations and climate change advocates often have only anecdotal 
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evidence to back up their selection of particular visuals over others; moreover, 
practitioners’ intuitions about “effective” visual communication messages sometimes 
conflict with what researchers have found through controlled studies. 
Research on Climate Change Imagery 
The term ‘visual communication’ is an extremely broad one, with research on 
visuals and imagery having roots in a number of academic disciplines and fields (e.g., 
Messaris, 1997; King, 2014; Zillmann, 2002). As a consequence, an exploration of 
“climate visuals” might feasibly involve an analysis of disparate visual media, from maps 
and three-dimensional visualizations, to cartoons, infographics, graphs and even videos 
(O’Neill and Smith, 2014). Given the ubiquity of photographic images depicting climate 
change and the potential power of this type of visual to enhance engagement with climate 
change, our focus in the current paper was on photographic imagery. This decision does 
not imply that alternative visual media such as maps, cartoons, or infographics are less 
relevant for academic study, but it is notable that there are also very few systematic 
analyses of the effectiveness of climate change videos, cartoons, or infographics, despite 
their widespread use and assumed-efficacy in terms of public engagement (see O’Neill 
and Smith, 2014; Sheppard, 2012). 
A limited body of research primarily using qualitative methodologies (e.g., Q-
sort, focus groups) or content analysis has investigated how people think about and 
respond to photographic climate change imagery. Of the work that does exist, most 
grapples with the dual challenge of persuading the viewer that climate change is a 
significant issue while presenting it as a solvable one. There is also a related nascent 
literature using content analysis and related methods to examine how climate change is 
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framed and visualized in news media coverage (e.g., O’Neill, 2013; Rebich-Hespanha et 
al., 2015; Smith and Joffe, 2009). In a series of papers, O’Neill and colleagues (O’Neill, 
2013; O’Neill, Boykoff, Niemeyer, and Day, 2013; O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009) 
found that dramatic and potentially fear-inducing images of climate impacts and extreme 
weather are good at capturing people’s attention (i.e., they have high ‘salience’) and 
make climate change seem more important, but they can also act to distance viewers 
(both psychologically and geographically), leaving them feeling overwhelmed rather than 
motivated to respond to the risks portrayed. Distressing photos may prompt a “helpless 
hopeless” feeling in the viewer (Banse, 2012), although this is partially contradicted by 
recent Australian research (Leviston et al., 2014). In their work, Leviston et al. (2014) 
found that dramatic images of climate change impacts (including natural disasters and 
melting ice) prompted strong negative feelings (alarm, anger, fear, upset or frustration) 
and increased arousal, but these feelings did not undermine their willingness to respond. 
Images of climate ‘solutions’ tend to make people feel more able to do something about 
climate change (they have high ‘efficacy’), but at the same time can reduce people’s 
sense that the issue is an important one (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O’Neill et 
al., 2013). A recent study replicated these findings in a cross-national sample from 
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland (Metag et al., 2016). 
A similar tension exists around using ‘localized’ versus ‘distant’ climate images. 
Perhaps the most iconic climate change image— the polar bear—has come to function as 
the primary visual cue associated with the issue (Doyle, 2007). However, images such as 
this have become problematic, as they appear to actively reinforce impressions of climate 
change as a distant issue (Manzo, 2010) rather than motivate increased interest, concern, 
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and intentions to act. Nicholson-Cole (2005) found that focus group participants often 
explain that they are more touched by national and local imagery because it is easier to 
relate to and consequently is more upsetting. However, in research by O’Neill and Hulme 
four years later, the same reasoning was used by participants to say why local icons are 
disengaging: “it will only affect locals and is not as much of a global issue” (O’Neill and 
Hulme, 2009). A recent review of the research suggests that reducing the perceived 
distance of climate change may actually have unanticipated effects on engagement 
(McDonald et al., 2015). Existing evidence regarding the impacts of highlighting local 
versus distant or global impacts of climate change on affect and issue engagement 
remains mixed (McDonald et al., 2015), and no research has carefully examined the 
importance of distance in the context of climate change imagery specifically. 
Other aspects of the evidence base are more straightforward. People find it easier 
to engage with images if they include people (Banse, 2013; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; 
Braasch, 2013), and where direct eye-contact can be made with the subject of the image 
(Banse, 2013). While these conclusions are virtual ‘truisms’ among photographers, it is 
instructive to reflect on the images that participants in survey research spontaneously 
associate with the term ‘climate change’ (typically polar bears and ‘smokestacks’), which 
do not necessarily conform to these principles (Leiserowitz, 2006; Smith and 
Leiserowitz, 2014). As even this brief review of the literature highlights, therefore, there 
is a need for research that provides advocates with an evidence-based assessment of 
climate imagery impacts on audiences. 
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The Present Research 
One of the central goals of the present research was to explore non-experts’ 
perceptions of and reactions to different forms of photographic climate change imagery in 
a manner that would enable us to extract applicable insights to use in developing a public 
database of climate change photographs (www.climatevisuals.org) for use by groups or 
individuals interested in climate change communication, such as climate change 
advocacy organizations, bloggers, or journalists. Therefore, the methodological and 
analytical approach of the research was primarily and purposefully exploratory in nature, 
with the imagery selected and questions examined being centrally guided by the goal of 
making practical and ‘actionable’ recommendations for climate change communication. 
To gain a robust assessment of perceptions and responses to climate change images, we 
utilized both qualitative (structured discussion groups) and quantitative (experimental 
survey) methods. In both cases, participants were presented with a variety of photographs 
depicting climate change causes, impacts and solutions, and we assessed their reactions to 
these images ranging from their comprehensibility and aesthetic appeal to the emotions 
and motivations they evoked. Based on the extant literature, we anticipated that four 
broad features of images would be particularly important in shaping responses. 
First, images of climate change solutions were expected to generate the most 
positive affective reactions, whereas we expected images of causes and impacts to lead to 
more negative emotional responses (O’Neill et al., 2013). Second, images depicting 
ordinary people, particularly those either needing help (e.g., flood relief) or actively 
engaging in low-carbon behaviors (e.g., installing solar panels), were anticipated to be 
effective at “personalizing” climate change, increasing concern, and motivating a sense 
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of efficacy. Third, given recent evidence suggesting that depictions of climate change as 
localized can produce mixed reactions (e.g., reducing geographical distance vs. reducing 
temporal distance; McDonald et al., 2015; see also Rickard et al., 2016), we expected that 
there would be contrasting or even conflicting results with regard to images that depicted 
‘distant’ versus ‘localized’ images. Finally, given the importance of high quality visuals 
for catching attention and promoting engagement (cf. O’Neill and Smith, 2014), 
aesthetically appealing images that are evaluated as authentic and/or entertaining were 
expected to increase the extent to which participants would engage with and attend to 
images favorably. 
No research to date has utilized a cross-national, mixed methods approach to 
study how individuals react to climate imagery. By using diverse methods, the present 
research allowed us to identify and assess both similarities and differences in reactions to 
images as a function of how they were contextualized (i.e. in a participatory, dialogic 
context vs. individual images viewed as part of a controlled survey). As well as the many 
advantages it confers (in particular the potential to ‘triangulate’ between different data 
sources), mixed-methods research raises some additional questions and challenges that 
are not apparent in single-method designs, including the ordering of methodologies. In 
the current investigation, we deployed a ‘sequential exploratory’ design, using 
intentionally broad-brush and open-ended qualitative research to inform a narrower, more 
focused quantitative investigation (Creswell, 2013). This permitted us to use themes 
present in the existing literature to design the qualitative phase of the project, without 
unnecessarily restricting the scope of Study 1. Study 2 involved a more precise and 
systematic investigation of a smaller number of variables. Given the differences in these 
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two study designs, we anticipated both overlap and divergence in reactions to the images. 
Therefore, in addition to providing empirical insights into how the public reacts to 
climate change imagery, the design of our research also provided an opportunity to 
explore how methodological choices and differences may influence reactions to such 
imagery. 
Study 1. Structured Discussion Workshops 
Methods 
Participants and procedure 
Four structured discussion group workshops were held during June and July 2015 
to examine individuals’ responses to climate change images. The workshops took place 
in London and Berlin, with two workshops in each city. Individuals were recruited to 
participate in the workshops through online advertisements distributed through social 
media, online forums and email networks, as a well as classified sites. Interested 
individuals completed an online prescreening survey in order to obtain basic 
demographic information (age, gender, ethnicity and occupation). This ensured a diverse 
range of participants, broadly reflecting the demographic stratification of the U.K. and 
Germany. All participants were financially compensated (£35 in the UK and 45 Euros in 
Germany); each session lasted approximately 120 minutes. 
Both UK workshops took place in the same location on the same day. Six men 
and three women attended the afternoon workshop, while five men and four women 
attended the early-evening session. These participants all resided in London and came 
from diverse backgrounds in terms of occupation (e.g., civil servant, company director) 
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and age (three were 18–24, two aged 45–54 and one older than 75). Three participants 
were from an ethnic minority background. In the German workshops, 14 adults (age 
range 18–44) participated (the first session contained five women and three men; the 
second contained four women and two men). Participants in the German workshops were 
from a range of different countries including Spain and Canada as well as Germany (two 
identified being from an ethnic minority background). The majority of participants were 
university students or postgraduates in the German workshops. 
Materials and design 
The images (49 in total) selected for use were drawn from a ‘longlist’ created 
through a process of reviewing existing academic literature for key themes (e.g., the 
distinction between causes/ impacts/solutions emphasized in O’Neill, 2013), a series of 
semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders (academics, campaigners and 
journalists; see the Appendix to Corner et al., 2015 for further description of the 
stakeholder interviews), and an informal review of images and visual trends in high-
profile climate change campaigns. The challenge was to select images from this longlist 
that would best provoke and stimulate conversation (rather than to systematically ‘match’ 
or ‘contrast’ images in a highly-controlled way). Nonetheless, we were able to select – 
through an iterative process of reflection and analysis among the research team – clusters 
of images (or ‘image sets’) that reflected the key themes identified from the existing 
literature and our stakeholder interviews (the full set of images utilized, and related 
images where copyright policies prevent reprinting, can be found in the online report at 
www.climatevisuals.org and the appendices to that report). These image sets included the 
central depiction of climate change causes, impacts, and solutions, as well as sets of 
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images depicting “clichéd” climate change imagery (e.g., polar bears), location 
differences (e.g., local vs. distant climate change impacts), the presence of 
people/animals, protest imagery, and images of politicians or celebrities.   
The design of the discussion groups was adapted from the ‘narrative workshop’ 
methodology developed by Climate Outreach (Corner and Roberts, 2014), and reflects 
principles of participatory deliberative public engagement used to study public 
perceptions of a wide range of social and scientific/technological issues (e.g., Pidgeon 
et al., 2009, 2013). Participants were first asked to discuss their core values and sense of 
identity prior to introducing the topic of climate change into the conversation. Image 
sets were then presented to participants by the facilitator sequentially, typically two sets 
at a time (to encourage and promote comparison and contrast between the sets of 
images). For logistical reasons of space around the discussion table, image sets were 
removed once they had been discussed, but were sometimes re-introduced if 
participants requested them or referred to them. The first image set for each discussion 
group was always the ‘clichéd climate imagery’ category, but the order that subsequent 
sets were presented varied between groups according to the direction that the 
conversation took. It is important to note that individual images were not captioned, and 
image sets were not labelled. Thus, the central aim of presenting the image sets was not 
to elicit a judgment from every participant on every image, but to provide a structured 
(and theoretically informed) framework within which to facilitate the deliberations. 
The facilitators used a variety of questions to prompt responses to the images 
(see Table 4). In each of the workshop, a standardized script was provided for the 
 84 
facilitator, but as is typical in exploratory, qualitative work of this kind, conversations 
differed to some extent between each workshop. 
Table 4. Categories and examples of questions discussed in the structured discussion 
groups. 
Category Example Questions 
Understanding/ 
salience 
 
“What is this trying to convey/what does it show?”  
 “Is it difficult to understand?” 
Psychological 
distance/self-
identification 
 
“Does the image ‘connect’ with you?” 
“Are the people in the image ‘like you’ or ‘other’?” 
Affect (emotion) “Does the image convey an emotion, and if it does, how does this 
make you feel?” “Fearful/fatalistic or hopeful/optimistic? 
Worried or reassured?”  
“Does the image depict something/someone 
‘good/desirable/right’ or ‘bad/wrong/evil’?” 
‘Action’ (efficacy) 
and ‘personal 
engagement’ 
“Does the image spark any desire to ‘respond’ to the situation 
depicted?” 
“What kind of response...something you could do yourself? 
Supporting a campaign? Lobbying politicians? Wanting to know 
more?” 
Politics and values “What (if any) political sentiments does the image convey? What 
values does it communicate?”  
“Do these match or conflict with your own?” 
Aesthetics and 
humor 
 
“Do you find the image visually attractive or not...is it the sort of 
image you would want to look at?” 
“Did the image surprise you or make you laugh? Is that a good or 
a bad thing?” 
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Results 
All discussion groups were audio recorded and detailed notes were taken from 
these audio recordings. Analyses proceeded through an iterative process of reading, 
thematic coding and reflection, with a particular focus on the variables described in 
Table 4. A variety of themes emerged from the four workshops. We focus here on three 
broad clusters of key findings: the importance of depicting credible and ‘authentic’ 
human subjects in the images; the critical reception given to ‘clichéd’ climate images 
and depictions of protests and demonstrations; and, the complexities of ‘localized’ 
images in terms of participants’ reactions. Readers interested in further exploring the 
qualitative findings are referred to the project report (Corner et al., 2015). 
The importance of credible and authentic human subjects 
Results are consistent with past research indicating that imagery containing 
people tends to be more powerful, and that people respond more strongly to photos of 
one individual rather than many (Markowtiz et al., 2013; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; Slovic, 
2007). For example, one photograph showed a man in danger in a flood in Pakistan. 
One focus group member commented that, "[the photo].shows how it [climate change] 
affects the people rather than the community . . . you don’t need a lot of people to 
convey a message, I think just the one person by himself it’s really heart breaking to 
look at that.” 
Eye contact in photos also appeared to be important for promoting attentiveness, 
interest, and concern when viewing imagery of people (cf. Fox et al., 2007). In one 
image, a Nigerian man looks directly at the camera whilst gesturing to a fire behind 
him. Even though this image was not entirely understood by the participants in terms of 
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how it related to climate change, the distress in the man’s face prompted the desire to 
seek out more information about what was happening. One participant commented that: 
“there's something in his face, like he's scared for his life, so whether it's war, fire, 
bomb, whatever that's reaction is hard to fake . . . " Where people were not present, 
some participants even requested their presence, with one group member remarking: ‘I 
want scientists as well and guys in white coats, dead serious experts in their field 
staring you in the face, going get it together man, that's the sort of thing that motivates 
me’. This latter finding also fits with recent research in the public health domain 
suggesting that images of scientists can bolster the effectiveness of scientific consensus 
based messaging strategies (Dixon et al., 2015; see also Van der Linden et al., 2015a). 
The generally strong reaction among participants to identifiable individuals, 
who seemed genuinely in distress, was in part driven by one of the most consistent 
findings to emerge from the discussion groups: participants were disinterested in and 
reacted with disdain toward photos that they perceived as ‘staged’, and reported greater 
interest and felt more persuaded by images that appeared to be ‘authentic'. This 
manifested itself in a number of ways, and had an influence on images of causes, 
impacts and solutions alike; participants were generally cynical about the images they 
viewed and wary of being “taken in”. 
Several of the images depicting solutions to climate change were particularly 
prone to perceptions of inauthenticity. A photograph of children posing with and 
celebrating their school's solar panels was met with cynical reactions. Participants 
described this image as ‘staged’ and ‘gimmicky’. Another image depicting a man 
installing draught excluders (draught stoppers) while being watched by a smiling family 
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was also strongly disliked and met with ridicule: “I think that family needs to get out a 
little more” [general laughter] “They're a little too excited about the draught excluding”. 
Images seen as staged and inauthentic also generated associations with advertising and 
marketing, which appeared to reduce their effectiveness for participants: “that's a 
problem for me, I don't want to feel like I'm being sold the idea of, if it has to be sold to 
me then I don't need it . . . " However, photos that appeared unstaged and which 
displayed low-carbon lifestyles in a tangible way prompted positive, optimistic 
reactions. For example, an image of a man rolling out roof insulation was preferred 
because, ‘it looks like “real work” is going on’. 
In contrast, participants’ responses to photos of politicians were, unsurprisingly, 
reflective of their political views. But the distaste for politicians as credible climate 
‘messengers’ seemed to go beyond personal preferences and extended to a general 
cynicism about the political process as a whole, with one German group member 
commenting that all the images of politicians, “make me almost vomit." Obviously 
staged photos of politicians—for example an image of David Cameron posing with a 
husky dog— nearly always prompted negative reactions, whereas more ‘day to day' 
photos of politicians were sometimes met with less disdain. Some fairly mundane 
images of negotiators at a climate change summit were received more favorably than 
other photos of politicians, because they portrayed active engagement with climate 
change and appeared less staged. 
Cynicism towards ‘climate clichés’ 
When asked (before being shown any photographs) at the beginning of the 
discussion groups what image first came to mind when they thought of climate change, 
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participants readily made a series of associations – polar bears, melting ice, a burning 
globe, fire, pollution, and coal power stations. However, when shown these ‘clichéd' 
images, few appeared to be persuaded or more concerned about climate change when 
viewing them. Participants identified these images as having lost their impact precisely 
because of their familiarity and over-use: ". . . the polar bear and the burning earth 
makes me angry for some reason. Not because I'm like, oh no that's a pressing issue, but 
like ‘oh this is so annoying’." A widely circulated image of a burning earth held in a 
human hand prompted a number of mixed reactions. Some liked it because, ‘it kind of 
says the world is in our hands a responsibility to take care of . . . just like we take care 
of our children,’ but others referred to it as “a bit stupid”, “a bit naff” and "[it] just 
pisses me off”. One group member commented that it felt to him like “propaganda” 
forcing him to react in a certain way when he wasn't sure he wanted to. 
A minority of participants was still moved by some of these clichéd images, 
particularly those depicting polar bears. Some participants reported that they might be 
motivated to respond pro-socially after seeing the polar bear imagery, but this was 
largely in reference to helping the polar bear specifically: “I feel really sorry for the 
polar bears, I might donate for the polar bear thingy, but not for global warming”. 
Similarly, images of land drying out, deforestation, and droughts that are also familiar 
clichés were not readily associated with climate change: " . . . .if someone was to pass 
me this image [of a man in a dried out landscape] it would be like, poverty, third world 
countries. This is just what I've been raised to think. This wouldn't affect me as far as 
climate change." These results pose a difficulty for climate change communicators: the 
imagery most readily associated with climate change may not be the most effective at 
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promoting concern about climate change or intentions to take personal action. Overuse 
of certain types of images results in a reduction in their effectiveness, and may even 
come to be seen as inauthentic and this seemed to extend in the minds of most 
discussion group participants to images that depicted climate protests and 
demonstrations. 
While participants expressed interest in and sympathy for social justice issues 
and some concern about climate change, most were not sympathetic to ‘typical 
environmentalists’ or images of environmental protest. When asked to say how they 
pictured environmental campaigners, one London group member described, " . . . 
someone who chains themselves to a fracking banner . . . someone that marches and 
don't really want to communicate the full facts." Another categorized marchers as, 
“either hipsters trying to be cool or . . . lunatic extremists." Consistent with these 
negative impressions, images of environmental protestors often prompted accusations 
of hypocrisy. In Germany, one participant objected to an image of a child at a climate 
change protest. The child, who was holding a banner in the shape of a foam finger, was 
described as: " . . . a classic example of jumping on the bandwagon. She wants you to 
take the threat seriously, but these balloons, and this foam finger, are the worst for the 
environment. It's so outrageous, a lot of the time these protestors that are protesting 
climate change are doing things like this." An image of a protester with his face painted 
blue was perhaps the most negatively received of all the photographs we tested. He was 
accused of being a ‘frat guy’ or alternatively someone who " . . . probably used the 
same face paint to paint himself at Glastonbury this weekend, and rubbed out climate 
and put Kanye West." Overall, participants did not like the generic protest images 
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either. One picture prompted the comment, “For me, it feels like I've seen that image a 
1000 times for pretty much every cause there is in the world”. Specific campaign 
related jargon in images, such as ‘divest' or ‘climate justice’, meant little to the group 
members and mostly prompted confusion. 
The complexities of ‘localizing’ climate images 
The results of our discussion groups support the idea that reducing the 
psychological distance of climate change as a strategy for engagement and the 
effectiveness of displaying local climate change impacts are not as straightforward as 
previously thought. While localizing climate change may possess some advantages, 
what counts as a ‘local’ impact and whether this motivates or undermines concern about 
the wider climate issue was mixed. For example, photographs of recent flooding in the 
UK and Germany— events that have already been linked to the warming climate—were 
met with a mix of positive and negative reactions. Several participants said the images 
made climate change feel more immediate, and worrying: " I think [image of people 
protesting about flooding on a Pacific island] is good, but personally for me [image of a 
flood in a UK town] has got more of an effect, because it’s local, because you can 
actually see that something’s happened”. However, not all participants exhibited this 
type of response. 
One key factor that emerged in responses to localized imagery was participants’ 
consideration of how the effects of climate change would impact wealthier countries 
relative to those less well off. One participant objected to the concept that local, familiar 
imagery should be used to produce reactions in Westerners, arguing “for me the whole 
point of climate change is it's about knowing what's going on outside your bubble . . . to 
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me Western people saying they feel more sorry for western people because they get 
flooded . . . to me that's really selfish”. 
Participants’ responses suggested that they believed Western countries would be 
relatively resilient to climate change impacts, and were thus less concerned about the 
negative impacts of climate change when depicted in these local contexts. Flooding in 
Germany or the UK was perceived by some as less of a serious issue than effects in 
other countries: 
“A flood in this country doesn't have the same emotional effect as a flood in 
other countries, it's going about, you're not massively inconvenienced in that 
picture”. [looking at an image of a UK town, flooded to knee/waist level]. “And 
that  I know that guy's fine  if his house got flooded, he'll be fine, he'll get 
money from insurance or whatever because that's the society that we're living." 
In comparison, some participants had strong reactions to images of people 
experiencing climate change impacts in distant places: ‘ . . . .with [image of a Nigerian 
man looking directly at the camera whilst gesturing to a fire behind him] . . . he seems 
like in real emotional pain and it kind of affects me. Not like before when you have 
people yaaay solar panels . . . an honest reaction to the situation, losing everything he 
used to have.’ 
Study 1 Discussion 
The results of the discussion groups yielded a number of novel insights about 
reactions to visual imagery related to climate change and relate to the four broad 
categories of images that we expected to play a central role in participants’ evaluations. 
First, the perceived authenticity and credibility of human subjects in the images 
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evaluated played a consistent role in shaping participants’ judgments, with ‘real people’ 
preferred to ‘staged’ images of politicians, or even environmental protestors. Images 
where the subjects were ‘celebrating’ rather than simply engaging with low-carbon 
technologies were typically viewed as contrived, rather than compelling or motivating. 
Taken together, these findings support and extend the findings of previous studies 
showing that solutions-focused imagery is likely to evoke more positive reactions 
(O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009; O’Neill et al., 2013), and that ordinary people in 
images can provide a ‘personalizing’ influence (Banse, 2013; Nicholson-Cole, 2005; 
Braasch, 2013). However, they also suggest some clear but challenging conclusions for 
climate campaigners, as the depiction of ‘celebratory’ groups around particular climate 
solutions and picture of demonstrators on protest marches are common. 
Second, our findings also fit with the growing understanding of the complexity 
of reducing the ‘psychological distance’ of climate change as a strategy for increasing 
engagement and action on climate change (McDonald et al., 2015). Images depicting 
local climate change impacts, while effective for some, also had a number of 
unanticipated consequences. Primary among these was the fact that participants 
believed that impacts in other less developed nations were going to be worse and that 
the UK and Germany would be resilient against climate change impacts. Therefore, 
depicting local impacts appeared to reduce concern and to some extent trivialize the 
issue. For some participants, depicting local impacts was even seen as offensive, with 
the belief that concern about climate change should not rest purely on self-interest, but 
rather on concern about global impacts. 
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Despite the rich findings derived from this participative exploration of public 
opinion, qualitative methods alone are not able to furnish climate change 
communicators with systematic data on public responses to climate change imagery. 
Study 2 was therefore designed to provide a complimentary methodological approach to 
understanding public responses to climate imagery, focusing on a smaller number of 
images, but drawing on a much larger (and representative) sample. 
Study 2. Online Survey Experiment 
In order to build on and test the generalizability of findings from the discussion 
groups, we developed an online survey with embedded experiment to administer cross-
nationally. A smaller number of images from Study 1 were selected for use in Study 2 
on the basis of three criteria: first, to comply with the tripartite cause/ impact/solution 
distinction; second, to reflect a degree of diversity within each of these categories (e.g. 
climate impact images depicted a range of impacts); and third, where specific images in 
Study 1 had attracted particular attention (e.g., an image of children ‘celebrating’ 
around newly installed solar panels). Our outcome variables included many of the 
dimensions that emerged during the discussion groups (e.g., understanding of image 
meaning, emotional reactions) but were also designed to assess aspects we considered 
particularly important to quantify (e.g., willingness to share the images, motivations to 
change behavior after seeing the image). We also sought to gain a more nuanced 
perspective on how these different image types are interpreted by individuals with 
different identities. Therefore, we also explored cross-national differences in responses 
to imagery, as well as the role of climate change skepticism in determining how 
participants reacted to differing types of climate change imagery. Given the growing 
 94 
role of social media and importance of social sharing and “viral” media, we were also 
interested in assessing how individuals thought others would react to these images. As 
this was not a direct focus of the findings presented here, the descriptive results of these 
analyses can be found in Appendix C. 
Methods 
Participants 
A market research firm, Research Now, was contracted to conduct a three-
country, online (internet) survey with embedded experiment in the US, UK and 
Germany. Research Now provided non-probability, nationally representative quota 
samples for each country. These samples are matched to country-level census data on 
geographic region, gender and age, and education level was also tracked in the U.S. 
Difficulty in obtaining a sufficient number of older adults in all countries resulted in 
samples that slightly underrepresent adults over the age of 65 (M = 44.46, SD = 16.60, 
Median = 44, Min = 18, Max = 88). In total, 3014 participants (U.S., n = 1001; U.K., n 
= 1007; Germany, n = 1006) participated in the study. Gender quotas were met closely 
(51.4% female). 
Measures and procedure 
Research Now invited individuals to participate in a 15–20 min survey in 
exchange for financial compensation. The survey was conducted in the primary 
language of the country in which participants lived (English for US and UK, German 
for Germany). The research team constructed the original survey materials in English, 
which were then translated into German by a native speaker. A second native German 
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speaker later reviewed the translated version of the survey. Where appropriate, changes 
to improve readability and comprehension were made. 
After consenting to participate in the study, participants reported on their degree 
of climate change skepticism using two items (e.g., “I am uncertain about whether 
climate change is happening or not”; 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 
3.71, SD = 1.663; r = 0.552). Skepticism did not differ between experimental 
conditions, F(2, 3011) = 2.061, p = 0.127, R2 = 0.001. However, the three countries 
slightly differed on their level of skepticism, F(2, 3011) = 9.231, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.006, 
with the U.S. sample (M = 3.82, SD = 1.768) and U.K. sample (M = 3.78, SD = 1.632) 
reporting greater slightly greater skepticism than the German sample (M = 3.53, SD = 
1.570; differences between U.S. and U.K. are not statistically significant, but both 
significantly differ from Germany at p < 0.001). 
Participants were then randomly assigned to see images that portrayed either 
climate change causes, impacts, or solutions, which served as the three conditions for 
the experimental component of the study (approximately 333 participants in each 
country saw causes, impacts, or solutions). In total, each participant saw a series of six 
images from one category, which were fully randomized within condition (the set of 
images used in the experiment, as well as descriptive statistics for each individual 
image, can be found in the online report at www.climatevisuals.org/research/). 
After each image was displayed on the screen, participants were asked to 
respond to a set of six items. As there are no psychometrically validated measures of 
reactivity to climate change imagery, the scale items were created by the researchers to 
address some of the key themes and focal points of the findings from Study 1. Table 5 
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displays these items and the construct they were intended to measure. After completing 
all measures for all six images shown, participants were thanked for their participation. 
Results 
 
Table 6 displays the correlations between each outcome variable in this study. 
Our primary analyses examined whether there were differences between our 
experimental conditions (causes vs. impacts vs. solutions) on our outcome variables. 
Therefore, we computed average scores for participants’ responses (i.e., understanding, 
affect, etc.) collapsed across the six images that they saw during the study. The majority 
of these were very highly correlated with one another. However, emotional responses to 
images were only weakly correlated with the other outcomes. 
Table 5. Constructs, items, and scales used in the online survey experiment. 
Construct Item Scale 
Understanding of 
image 
To what extent do you feel as 
though you have an understanding 
of what this image is trying to 
convey?” 
1 = not at all, 
5 = completely 
Affective response 
On a scale of -5 to +5, where -5 
equals “really negative” and +5 
equals “really positive,” how does 
this image make you feel? 
-5 = really negative, 
+5 = really positive 
Information seeking 
motivations 
How motivated do you feel to seek 
out more information about what 
this image depicts? 
1= not at all motivated, 
4 = very motivated 
Willingness to share 
the image 
Compared to most other images 
about climate change that you’ve 
seen, how much more or less willing 
would you be to share this image 
with friends on social media? 
1 = much less willing, 
5 = much more willing 
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Motivation to change 
personal behavior 
Does the image make you want to 
change your own behavior to reduce 
your impact on the environment? 
1 = not at all 
5 = very much 
Motivation to 
support climate 
change policy 
“Does the image make you more or 
less supportive of government 
policies to tackle climate change?” 
1 = much less 
supportive 
7 = much more 
supportive 
 
Emotional response to images 
There was a large and significant effect of condition on participants’ affective 
reactions to the images in each category, F(2, 3011) =747.174, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.332. 
Images of climate change solutions generated a modestly positive emotional reaction 
(M = 1.21, SD = 1.653), whereas images of climate change impacts (M = 1.14, SD = 
1.97) and causes (M = 1.68, SD = 1.695) both generated negative emotional reactions. 
Tukey’s post-hoc analyses indicate that all three conditions significantly differed from 
one another on affective reactions (Mean differences ranged from 0.54 to 2.88, p’s < 
0.001). 
Table 6. Bivariate correlations between study measures assessing responses to imagery. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Understanding (1) 1      
Emotional 
response (2) .067 1     
Seek out 
information (3) .634 .090 1    
Share image with 
others (4) .580 .109 .818 1   
Change personal 
behavior (5) .601 .057** .857 .834 1  
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Support 
government 
climate policy (6) 
.554 .037* .747 .809 .828 1 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, all other coefficients are significant at p < .001 
 
Motivation to change personal behavior and support government policy 
There was also a significant effect of image condition on expressed motivations 
to change personal behavior after viewing the images, F(2, 3011) = 37.128, p < 0.001, 
R2 = 0.024. Climate change impacts generated the greatest desire to change personal 
behavior (M = 3.36, SD = 1.023), which was significantly greater than motivations 
generated by causes (M = 3.17, SD = 0.973; Mean difference = 0.189, p < 0.001) and 
solutions (M = 2.98, SD = 0.954; Mean difference = 0.379, p < 0.001). The effect of 
image condition on support for climate change policy at the governmental level was 
also small but significant and followed the same pattern as the results for personal 
behavior, F(2, 3011) = 44.998, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.029. Images of impacts generated 
greater support (M = 4.84, SD = 1.20) for climate change policy than pictures of causes 
(M = 4.65, SD = 1.083; Mean difference = 0.193, p < 0.001) and solutions (M = 4.36, 
SD = 1.141; Mean difference = 0.481, p < 0.001). 
Motivations to share images with others 
Image category also produced a significant effect on participants’ willingness to 
share the images with others, F(2, 3011) = 32.591, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.021. Images of 
impacts generated the greatest motivation to share the images with others (M = 3.40, SD 
= 0.899). Solutions images were the least likely to engender motivations to share (M = 
3.09, SD = 0.851), while causes fell in between the impacts and solutions categories (M 
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= 3.22, SD = 0.819). Post-hoc analyses revealed that all conditions differed 
significantly, if minimally, from one another (Mean differences > 0.18, p’s < 0.005). 
Understanding of images and motivations to seek out more information. 
Understanding of the images was also significantly affected by 2 image 
condition, F(2, 3011) = 22.821, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.015. Images of climate change 
impacts were slightly better understood by participants (M = 3.80, SD = 0.813) than 
causes (M = 3.66, SD = 0.798, Mean difference = 0.141, p < 0.001) or solutions (M = 
3.55, SD = 0.815; Mean difference = 0.243, p < 0.001). Consistent with these findings, 
there was also a small but significant effect of condition on motivations to seek out 
more information, F(2, 3011) = 27.146, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.018. Impacts images 
generated greater information seeking (M = 2.67, SD = 0.803) than causes (M = 2.53, 
SD = 0.766; Mean difference = 0.139, p < 0.001) or solutions (M = 2.42, SD = 0.761; 
Mean difference = 0.255, p < 0.001). 
Country level differences 
Table 7 displays tests of significance and mean differences between each 
country on the outcome measures, collapsed across image type. The German sample 
tended to report the highest reactivity to imagery used in the study (e.g., greater 
affective reactivity, greater willingness to change personal behavior, etc.), while 
participants in the United Kingdom tended to report the lowest responses. The country-
level effect on image responses was particularly pronounced for reported understanding 
of images, willingness to seek out more information, and motivation to change personal 
environmental behavior. The German sample significantly differed from both (Mean 
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differences > 0.35, p’s < 0.005), while the U.S. and U.K. samples did not significantly 
differ on affective reactivity in these two conditions (Mean differences < 0.15, p’s > 
0.7). In contrast, in the solutions condition, while all samples reported greater positive 
affect, the U.S. sample (M = 1.41, SD = 1.670) and German sample (M = 1.25, SD = 
1.599) reported comparable levels of positive affect (Mean difference = 0.16, p = 
0.442). The U.K. sample (M = 0.981, SD = 1.665) reported less positive affect in than 
the U.S. sample (Mean difference = 0.43, p = 0.002) and marginally less than the 
German sample (Mean difference = 0.27, p = 0.075). There were no other significant or 
trending interactions between image type and country of origin. 
Interaction between image type and climate change skepticism 
There were also significant interactions between climate change skepticism and 
image type condition on five of the six items assessing participants’ image responses. 
Table 8 displays the interactions for each measure (including the non-significant 
interaction for the understanding measure), each of which follows a very similar 
pattern. While in the causes and impacts conditions, greater skepticism predicts less 
pro-environmental responses (e.g., flatter emotional response, less willingness to 
change personal behavior), this effect is reduced in the solutions condition. This 
interaction appears to be driven by reduced motivations to act by non-skeptics after 
seeing solutions images, rather than a positive shift by skeptical participants. Similar, 
though weaker, interactions emerged for several measures when examining political 
ideology as a moderator rather than climate change skepticism (see Appendix C). 
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Table 7. Country-level differences on image responses collapsed across image-type. 
Item F R2 Country Mean SD 
Understanding 86.217*** .054 
U.K. 3.43 .805 
U.S. 3.68 .804 
Germany 3.89 .768 
      
Affective 
response 9.498*** .006 
U.K. -.434a 2.051 
U.S. -.392a 2.232 
Germany -.776 2.217 
      
Seek out more 
information 72.025*** .045 
U.K. 2.32 .776 
U.S. 2.58 .788 
Germany 2.72 .731 
      
Share image with 
others 14.133*** .009 
U.K. 3.12 .819 
U.S. 3.31b .889 
Germany 3.28b .878 
      
Change personal 
behavior 40.403*** .026 
U.K. 2.95 1.005 
U.S. 3.22 1.037 
Germany 3.33 .906 
      
Support 
government 
policy 
15.313*** .01 
U.K. 4.47 1.085 
U.S. 4.63 1.271 
Germany 4.75 1.101 
Note. Post-hoc analyses to examine between-country differences were performed using 
Tukey’s adjustment. Matching superscripts denote post-hoc tests that did not attain 
significance. All other post-hoc comparisons are significant at p < .05 
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Discussion 
The results of the experimental survey yielded a number of interesting findings, 
some consistent and some inconsistent with the results of the qualitative research (see 
General discussion below). Consistent with the qualitative results, images of politicians 
and protesters were rated as particularly ineffective in the quantitative study. Images of 
climate change impacts were the most effective at increasing self-reported motivations 
to change behavior and support government policy. While climate change impacts also 
produced negative emotional reactions, given these other findings, it seems that this 
negative affect may have been important for increasing intentions to act. In contrast, 
images of climate change solutions, while producing substantially more positive affect, 
also tended to score the lowest on motivations to change behavior, support government 
policy, or seek out more information about the image. Indeed, solutions images 
decreased non-skeptics’ issue engagement on nearly all response items such that there 
were no differences between skeptics and non-skeptics in that condition. Thus, it is not 
clear from this evidence that the use of solutions imagery on its own—while less 
polarizing—will be conducive to greater environmental action overall. This finding 
does in some days differ from O’Neill et al. (2013), who found that images of solutions 
produced greater feelings of self-efficacy in a Q-sort task. One possibility for this 
difference in results could be due to variations in the types of ‘solutions’ imagery used. 
For example, the images depicting solutions to climate change in the research presented 
here tended to focus on depicting concrete actions being taken by individuals, which 
may have communicated to individuals that they no longer needed to take personal 
action because others were doing so. Future research should examine the influence of 
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different types of ‘solutions’ imagery on behavior change, motivation, and efficacy in 
more detail to better understand these differences. 
Limitations of these findings include the use of single-item measures to assess 
each construct, as well as the fact that our items assessed self-reported intentions rather 
than measuring actual concrete behaviors. Future quantitative research should use 
expanded scale measures and assess actual behavior in order to more comprehensively 
understand the influence of different types of climate change imagery. Furthermore, the 
items assessed in this study, which were designed to gain a broad assessment of 
individuals’ perceptions, differed from some of the past research on imagery (e.g., 
O’Neill et al., 2013). Therefore future research would also benefit by using multiple 
measurement types from past research to better understand the diverse effects of 
imagery on public perceptions. 
Table 8. Interactions between climate change skepticism and imagery condition. 
 Interaction (F) Condition b SE 
95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Lower Upper 
  Causes -.04* .02 -.068 -.007 
Understanding 1.662 Impacts -.04* .01 -.070 -.012 
  Solutions -.01 .02 -.035 .025 
       
  Causes .41*** .03 .348 .473 
Affective response 118.399*** Impacts .53*** .03 .469 .588 
  Solution -.11*** .03 -.176 -.051 
       
  Causes -.05** .02 -.078 -.019 
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Seek out more 
information 3.739* Impacts 
-
.06*** .01 -.087 -.031 
  Solutions -.01 .01 -.034 .024 
       
  Causes -.04* .02 -.075 -.010 
Share image with 
others 3.045* Impacts 
-
.07*** .02 -.102 -.040 
  Solutions -.01 .02 -.047 -.017 
       
  Causes -.08*** .02 -.119 -.045 
Change personal 
behavior 5.306** Impacts 
-
.10*** .02 -.133 -.062 
  Solutions .02 .02 -.054 .020 
       
  Causes -.14*** .02 -.187 -.102 
Support government 
policy 5.736** Impacts 
-
.18*** .02 -.218 -.137 
  Solutions -.08*** .02 -.120 -.036 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 
 
General Discussion 
The current research presents some of the first evidence gathered regarding the 
impact of climate change imagery on individuals’ affective, attitudinal and behavioral 
responses to the issue. Using a unique (in this domain) combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, we uncovered a number of practically relevant and theoretically 
interesting findings that can inform and improve climate change communication in a 
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cross-national context. Importantly, we found points of both convergence and 
divergence between the results of the two studies, highlighting the critical importance 
of studying the impact of visual imagery using a variety of methods. For an expanded 
discussion of the research findings, see Corner et al., 2015 and the accompanying 
Appendix to that report. 
Images depicting climate change impacts, such as those displaying individuals 
with authentic, identifiable emotional expressions evoked issue concern and emotional 
reactions from participants in the discussion groups and, overall, images of impacts 
were the most motivating for individuals (e.g., intentions to change personal behavior) 
in the quantitative survey. Findings regarding images of climate change solutions were 
also similar across the two studies. In the survey, images of solutions evoked positive 
affect, but were among the least motivating for participants, while in the discussion 
groups, although images of individuals genuinely engaging with climate solutions were 
well regarded, a number of solution-based images (e.g., protestors advocating for 
solutions to climate change) were met with cynicism. 
The present work also challenges, or at least raises questions about, current 
orthodoxy regarding the communication of climate change impacts and causes versus 
solutions. Many climate communications guides (e.g., CRED & ecoAmerica, 2014) and 
research findings (e.g., Campbell and Kay, 2014) suggest that highlighting possible 
solutions to climate change is critical for engaging many audiences. Although doing so 
may be necessary in many cases, the present findings suggest images of such solutions 
(e.g., installing solar photovoltaics) may not be sufficient for motivating action, in part 
because audiences do not always connect these images to climate change. On the other 
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hand, images depicting climate impacts were readily connected to the issue by our 
participants and were also more motivating of action. Participants were also motivated 
to share these images with others and believed that they would be effective visuals for 
prompting others to act as well, although results from the qualitative work also indicate 
that these images can be overwhelming for viewers, possibly reducing engagement for 
some individuals (see also Lertzman, 2015). Together these results suggest that, just as 
with verbal climate communications (e.g., CRED & ecoAmerica, 2014), coupling 
images of climate impacts with concrete behavioral actions for people to take (i.e., 
solutions) may be particularly important for maintaining engagement. 
Our results also raise questions about the relative efficacy of localizing the issue 
of climate change for audiences. In our discussion groups, many participants exhibited 
greater empathetic reactions to depictions of distant climate change impacts, 
particularly in developing countries. In contrast, some participants saw local climate 
change impacts as either trivializing the issue or else as offensive by focusing on one’s 
own country rather than others. These results align with recent work suggesting that at 
least some groups (e.g., Democrats) react more positively to stories about climate 
impacts affecting people living far off geographically or temporally (Hart and Nisbet, 
2012). However, this was also one area where the two studies disagree, as localized 
images fared better than more distant images in the survey experiment. One possible 
explanation that can accommodate both sets of findings (and corresponds to current 
theorizing on psychological distance) is that localized images are effective to the extent 
that they are perceived as serious (rather than trivializing the wider issue of climate 
change by suggesting that limited local disruption is equivalent to major climate 
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impacts elsewhere). Future research is needed to more comprehensively examine how 
different climate change images impact individuals’ perceptions of the psychological 
distance of climate change. 
Finally, the results of both studies also suggest that clichéd images of climate 
change produce mixed responses among the public. Images that our survey participants 
could quickly and easily understand  such as ‘smokestacks’, deforestation, and polar 
bears on melting ice – were positively received and associated with the greatest support 
for climate change policy and action. In the qualitative work, however, while these 
‘classic’ climate images were easily recognizable by participants, they also produced a 
muted emotional response and often prompted cynicism. Together, these results 
highlight the challenging balance communicators must strike between using easily-
recognizable but over-saturated climate images and less familiar but potentially more 
engaging visuals. Our work suggests that contextualizing less familiar but potentially 
powerful images by connecting them with more readily recognizable aspects of climate 
change may be one effective pathway forward. 
Future Directions 
The present findings raise a number of important questions to be resolved by 
future research. Perhaps most critically, additional research is needed to examine 
whether different types of solutions-based imagery resonate more or less strongly with 
particular audiences, as recent work suggests that various solutions (e.g., more 
regulation versus more reliance on nuclear energy) appeal to different audiences in 
quite divergent ways (e.g., Kahan et al., 2011). More generally, additional research is 
needed to identify ways in which the positive affect associated with many climate 
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solutions can be leveraged into greater issue engagement. In addition, future research 
should continue to unpack the complex dynamics involved in using imagery that depicts 
climate change impacts and how this interacts with key issues such as psychological 
distance, reactance and apathy (see McDonald et al., 2015; O’Neill et al., 2013). 
Another fruitful future research direction would be to examine how photographic 
climate change imagery may differentially influence individuals’ responses depending 
on different accompanying text-based frames of climate change. For example, Hart and 
Feldman (2016) recently found that images of solar panels were more likely to increase 
perceived efficacy to act on climate change when text accompanying the image 
discussed actions that can be taken to address climate change. 
It is also worth re-emphasizing that the research presented here focused on 
photographic climate change imagery, rather than visuals about climate change more 
broadly. However, it seems likely that a number of the principle themes uncovered in 
these analyses may reasonably extend to other forms of visuals. The value of 
authenticity is likely to be important regardless of the visual medium, and indeed may 
emerge as even more important in other mediums aside from photographs (e.g., 
documentary films, animations). There may be other instances where divergence in 
responses occurs across types of visuals. For example, producing effective illustrations, 
infographics or animations may follow different criteria for effectiveness than 
photographs or films altogether (e.g., is presenting people in a cartoon depicting climate 
change similar to presenting real people in photographs?). These are important 
empirical questions beyond the scope of the present investigation; future research is 
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needed to uncover the relative importance of different principles examined here in the 
context of other visual mediums. 
Finally, points of both convergence and divergence between the findings of our 
qualitative and quantitative work point to the importance of mixed-methods studies in 
this domain. One important advantage of qualitative over quantitative methods in the 
context of studying climate imagery is the ability they provide to more fully 
contextualize images for study participants; the lack of context in the quantitative work 
may help explain some of the findings regarding both iconic and solutions-oriented 
imagery. On the other hand, quantitative approaches can support generalizability. 
Although the design and findings of these studies do not permit definitive explanations 
of the points of divergence between the quantitative and qualitative findings, several 
possibilities exist. First, the discussion group design may have permitted participants to 
be more elaborative both in their cognitive processing of the images themselves as well 
as in their reported reactions to the imagery. In contrast, the closed-ended, narrowly 
specific questions that participants answered in the quantitative study may not have 
allowed for the same degree of elaboration by participants. In future mixed-methods 
approaches, allowing for open-ended responses by participants in the quantitative 
portion, as well as assessing depth of information processing, may help shed light on 
the origin of these discrepancies. Second, whereas in the quantitative survey 
participants viewed the images by themselves one at a time, participants in the 
discussion groups viewed the images in rotating sets (and saw all of the images of the 
causes, impacts, and solutions) in a group setting. These clear contextual differences 
may have allowed for different elaborations and interpretations of the images, such as 
 110 
participants cognitively comparing and contrasting the image sets differently while 
responding in the two studies. Future mixed-methods research might consider 
standardizing the cross-method design and deliberately asking participants to make or 
not make comparisons across images sets in order to help explore the effects these 
processes may have on responses. Future research should continue to use a mixed-
methods approach as well as attempt to capture the unique advantages afforded by 
various methodologies in order to better understand how individuals interpret and react 
to what will often be strongly-framed, context-rich climate imagery. 
Addendum: Bayesian Modeling of Cultural Worldviews 
Overview 
The results provided in Chapter 4 highlight some inferential, though primarily 
descriptive, findings on how individuals perceive and respond to climate change imagery, 
and how this is influenced by the type of imagery, country, and climate change 
skepticism. While beneficial in a general sense, the aforementioned analyses suffer from 
several methodological limitations. Inferences from the statistical models relied primarily 
on descriptive comparison, and p-values were reported as an inferential measure in spite 
of their lack of utility in the case of the large participant sample recruited. Furthermore, 
these preliminary analyses were done in a piecemeal fashion using fixed-effects 
regression/ANOVA, rather than through a more unified hierarchical regression 
framework.  
While participants responded to the dependent measures after each image viewed, 
in the initial analyses I averaged across responses to different images within condition 
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(i.e., averaged affective responses across all of the images participants viewed). However, 
this process of averaging can mask important variability captured from such within-
subject measurements, and can lead to more biased estimates (McElreath, 2016). 
Therefore, in the hierarchical regression models presented which analyze outcomes 
related to the imagery, I allowed the intercept of the model to vary across each image 
participants saw. Furthermore, while effects across each country appeared modest, 
allowing the model intercepts to vary across each country rather than entering country as 
a fixed-effect covariate is considered a better approach to modelling such variability 
(Gelman et al., 2013). 
Further, these analyses did not directly address the role of cultural worldviews in 
motivating respondents’ climate change attitudes or their responses to the images that 
they viewed. As noted in the main body text, other measures were included in the full 
survey experiment that were not able to be reported in the main text due to space 
limitations of the original publisher. Inclusion of these measures allows for a more 
theoretically-informed investigation. In particular, Kahan et al.’s (2011) 12-item cultural 
worldview measure was included, which measures worldviews along the dimensions of 
hierarchical-egalitarian and individualist-communitarian. Theoretically, these worldview 
measures are thought to be antecedents to climate change attitudes, and associated with 
political ideology to varying degrees; Kahan et al. (2011) explored the role of cultural 
worldviews by entering these measures and their interaction as predictors of climate 
change attitudes. In general, higher hierarchical and higher individualist attitudes tend to 
be associated with greater negative climate change attitudes, whereas the reverse is true 
for egalitarian and communitarian attitudes.  
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Therefore, instead of taking the approaches described in the main text of Chapter 
4 (e.g., fitting an interaction between climate change skepticism and experimental 
condition), I fit a series of more theoretically-driven and empirically robust models. In 
addition to providing a follow-up to Kahan et al. (2011) using a large, multi-national 
sample of respondents, these data also offer the ability to directly assess the factor 
structure of the 12-item measurement and examine any cross-national differences in the 
measurement structure. The analyses described here extend Kahan et al. (2011) and the 
prior work discussed in Chapters 2 and 4 by examining the role of cultural worldviews, 
political ideology, and climate change skepticism in influencing responses to visual 
imagery used to depict climate change. 
 The relationships between cultural worldviews, political ideology, and climate 
change skepticism were explored by fitting a model to predict skepticism from the other 
measures of interest, alongside key demographic predictors. This model was then 
extended to also examine how these factors influence perceived threats from climate 
change. Finally, participants’ responses to the climate change imagery were modelled 
using a more parsimonious, theoretically informed modelling approach (e.g., 
incorporating cultural worldviews and key demographics, using dimension reduction to 
create composites), while also modelling the data in a more appropriate, hierarchical 
manner. 
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Measures 
Cultural worldviews 
To measure cultural worldviews, Kahan et al.’s (2011) 12-item self-report 
measure was used. This measure includes items designed to assess the hierarchical-
egalitarian (HE) and individualist-communitarian (IC) dimensions of cultural worldviews 
(see Table 9). Based on the procedure of Kahan et al. (2011), all items were scored on 
six-point Likert-type scales (strongly disagree to strongly agree) with no neutral 
midpoint. Six items measured HE total, with the three egalitarian items reverse coded for 
analysis. Of the six items measuring IC, the three measuring communitarian attitudes 
were also reverse coded. The HE items were averaged together into a single composite, 
as were the IC items, with higher scores reflecting greater hierarchical and individualistic 
worldviews, respectively. 
Table 9. Cultural worldview constructs and scale items. 
Variable Item Worldview 
IINTRSTS The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives. Individualism 
CHARM Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves. Communitarian 
IPROTECT It’s not the government’s business to try to protect people from themselves. Individualism 
IPRIVACY The government should stop telling people how to live their lives. Individualism 
CPROTECT 
The government should do more to advance 
society’s goals, even if it means limited the 
freedom and choices of individuals. 
Communitarian 
CLIMCHOI 
Government should put limits on the choices 
individuals can make so they don’t get in the 
way of what’s good for society. 
Communitarian 
HEQUAL We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. Hierarchical 
EWEALTH Our society would be better off it the distribution of wealth was more equal. Egalitarian 
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ERADEQ 
We need to dramatically reduce inequalities 
between the rich and the poor, whites and 
people of color, and men and women. 
Egalitarian 
EDISCRIM Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society. Egalitarian 
HREVDIS2 
It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and 
other groups don’t want equal rights, they want 
special rights just for them. 
Hierarchical 
HFEMININ Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine. Hierarchical 
Note. Egalitarian and Communitarian items were reverse scored for analysis. 
Following Kahan et al.’s statistical modelling approach (2011), the items were 
averaged along the HE and IC dimensions. A Cronbach’s alpha was computed for each 
six item composite as a rough index of reliability. The HE composite (M = 3.01, SD = 
.984, Median = 3.17) had adequate reliability, .76, 95% CI = .74, .77, while the IC 
composite (M = 3.75, SD = .781, Median = 3.67) had lower reliability, .63, 95% CI = .61, 
.65. Examination of the item-total correlations for the IC composite suggest that 
removing the IPRIVACY item would increase the alpha to .67. However, given that each 
sub-measure only consists of three items and this reliability increase is only incremental, 
the full measure was used for analysis. These measures had lower reliability than was 
found in Kahan et al. (2011; HE = .87, IC = .81). There was negative skew (.49, SE = .01) 
in the distribution of IC, while the skewness of HE was less prevalent (.07, SE = .02). 
Climate change skepticism 
The two items measuring climate change skepticism were scored on 7-point 
Likert-type scales, with higher scores indicating greater skepticism. These items are the 
same as those described in Chapter 4, but are provided here again for clarity and with 
extra psychometric detail. These items had a moderate correlation, r = .55, 95% CI = 
.526, .576, sharing approximately 30% of their variance. The items were averaged into a 
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composite score of skepticism, M = 3.71, SD = 1.66, Median = 4, which possessed very 
little skew (.05, SE = .03). However, the skepticism measure had noticeable clumping at 
the lowest scale point (n = 304) and at the midpoint (n = 540). 
Perceived threat of climate change impacts 
Near the end of the survey, participants were asked to respond to six items 
measuring the extent to which they were concerned about a variety of potential threats of 
climate change. These included sea level rise, migration, and drought, among other 
things, and were scored on 7-point scales (higher scores indicating greater concern). 
These measures had strong inter-item correlations, and were thus averaged into a general 
measure of perceived threat, .90, 95% CI = .89, .91. Participants were, on average, 
moderately concerned about these threats (M = 4.64, SD = 1.38, Median = 4.67), with 
only very modest skew observed in the measure (-.30, SE = .03). 
Pro-climate change responses, affective reactions, and understanding of imagery 
For modeling, a subset of items were selected from the post-image response items 
described in Chapter 4. This item reduction was based on both conceptual and statistical 
grounds. Motivations to change personal behavior and to support public climate change 
policy had a strong positive correlation sharing close to 70% of their variance, potentially 
indicative of a more general pro-climate change motivation, r = .83, 95% CI = .816, .839, 
R2 = .685. As these two items likely have similar psychological antecedents and were 
strongly correlated, they were averaged together into a composite measure. The single-
item affective response measure was analyzed as its own outcome, as was self-reported 
understanding of the images (see Tables 5 and 6 in Chapter 4 for more information on 
these measures). These two items were selected for analysis given their connection to 
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literatures on comprehension of climate change (Kahan et al., 2012) and on the role of 
affect in climate change decision making (Chapman, Lickel & Markowitz, 2017). Thus, 
three separate outcomes were modelled in response to the images participants viewed. 
Affect was reversed coded for this analysis to ease interpretation, such that higher scores 
reflect more negative affective reactions. Higher scores on the understanding item 
reflected greater self-reported understanding of the images. 
Results 
Factor analysis of worldviews 
While for the statistical modeling I focus on Kahan et al.’s (2011) two-composite 
format, I also performed confirmatory factor analyses to examine the factor structure of 
the full scale. Three structures were compared: the proposed two-factor solution (HE & 
IC as two factors), an alternative four factor solution treating each sub-measure 
individually, and a single-factor solution loading all items on one factor. In addition to 
fitting and comparing these models, I also tested whether this factor structure was similar 
or different across the three countries from which data were collected. 
Confirmatory factor analyses were performed using the lavaan package for R 
(Rosseel, 2012), and the tests of measurement invariance were performed in an 
automated fashion using the semTools package (semTools Contributors, 2016). All 
variables were standardized to fit the models (M = 0, SD = 1), and the structures were 
estimated using robust maximum likelihood estimation, Huber-White (sandwich) 
standard errors, and the Yuen-Bentler adjusted test statistic, as implemented in lavaan. 
The two-factor solution was not a good fit to the data, 𝜒𝜒2(53) = 4108.01, scaling 
correction factor = 1.357, robust CFI = .528, SRMR = .139. The factor loadings (see 
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Table 10) demonstrate that the hierarchical and egalitarian items had only modest factor 
loadings with one another, and the same is true for the individualism and communitarian 
items. The four factor solution had a substantially better fit to the data, although in 
absolute terms was only modestly well-fit, 𝜒𝜒2(48) = 653.56, scaling correction factor = 
1.328, robust CFI = .931, SRMR = .054. While most loadings were much more sensible, 
CHARM had a only a modest loading on the communitarian factor. Finally, the one 
factor model was tested. This model was not a good fit to the data, 𝜒𝜒2(54) = 5385.53, 
scaling correction factor = 1.363, robust CFI = .376, SRMR = .159. 
Table 10. Confirmatory factor analysis results: loadings of the two-factor solution. 
Construct Variable Loading Estimate Robust SE 
Hierarchical- 
Egalitarian (HE) 
HEQUAL 1.121 0.028 
HREVDIS2 1.288 0.027 
HFEMININ 1.158 0.026 
EWEALTH 0.366 0.044 
ERADEQ 0.473 0.043 
EWEALTH 0.474 0.039 
    
Individualist- 
Communitarian 
(IC) 
IINTRSTS 0.960 0.024 
IPROTECT 0.708 0.028 
IPRIVACY 1.051 0.024 
CHARM 0.166 0.033 
CPROTECT 0.209 0.040 
CLIMATECHOI 0.229 0.040 
Note. Loading estimates reflect standardized regression coefficients. Robust SE refers to 
sandwich standard errors. 
 
As only the four factor solution was an adequate fit to the data, I utilized this 
model to perform the tests of measurement invariance. Following the procedure of the 
semTools package, five models were tested and iteratively compared, beginning with the 
strictest model, the configural model. In the configural invariance model all aspects of the 
model are constrained to be equal across each country in the sample. Compared to the 
other models (e.g., varying loadings, varying intercepts, etc.), this model had the lowest 
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chi-squared estimate, 𝜒𝜒2(144) = 1062.1, compared with next best fitting model with 
varying loadings, 𝜒𝜒2(160) = 1289.4, χ2 difference(16) = 81.37, p < .001. These results are 
suggestive, though not conclusive, of the structure of these attitudes being roughly equal 
across the nations tested. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that future work using the 
cultural worldviews measures may need to further improve upon their properties. 
Bivariate associations among worldviews, skepticism, and political leaning 
HE and IC had a small positive correlation, r = .15, 95% CI = .114, .184, sharing 
just over 2% of their variance. HE had a much more robust positive association with 
right-leaning political attitudes, r = .47, 95% CI = .441, .497, sharing approximately 22% 
of their variance. The estimate of association between IC and right-leaning political 
attitudes was positive, but very small in magnitude, r = .05, 95% CI = .018, .089, R2 = 
.003. HE and climate change skepticism shared roughly 20% of their variance, and were 
positively associated, r = .45, 95% CI = .417, .474. Skepticism was also positively 
associated with IC, although this relationship was much less pronounced, r = .11, 95% CI 
= .077, .147, R2 = .013. The findings regarding climate change attitudes, ideology, and 
their association with HE and IC converge with those of past research on the subject. 
Modeling strategy 
The primary goal of these analyses was to build statistical models predicting 
climate change skepticism, perceived threats from climate change, and responses to the 
climate change imagery respondents viewed. Bayesian hierarchical models were 
estimated for each analysis. HE, IC, and their interaction were fit as the focal predictors 
(fixed effects) in each model described. Additionally, each model included gender (0 = 
Female, 1 = Male), age, and left-right political attitudes as covariates, given their 
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typically small, but potentially informative, effects on climate change attitudes (e.g., 
Hornsey et al. 2016). For the models of pro-climate change actions that were in reference 
to participants’ responses to climate change imagery, experimental condition was entered 
as a predictor for these models, as well as the dispositional measure of climate change 
skepticism. As participants provided ratings for each image in different conditions, the 
intercept of the model was allowed to vary by scores for each image. For all models, the 
intercept was also allowed to vary across each country represented. 
As noted, a Bayesian estimation approach was implemented to generate models 
and interpret their degree of uncertainty. In places where there was the potential for 
including or not including certain model terms (e.g., interaction terms), model 
comparison and weighting was performed to evaluate which models had the best 
estimated out-of-sample predictive performance. My approach to this comparison and 
evaluation stems from recommendations of Gelman et al. (2013) and McElreath (2016). I 
utilized approximate leave-one-out cross-validation to estimate out-of-sample predictive 
performance and generate model weights (Vehtari et al. 2017). 
All non-categorical predictors were standardized for the analyses (M = 0, SD = 1). 
Given that the pro-climate change motivation items are scored on two different scales, 
this outcome measure was also standardized in order to form an aggregated composite. I 
focus substantive model interpretation on the full posterior distributions of the models, 
and provide figures depicting the full posterior distributions of the fixed and random 
effects, as well as the estimated interaction effects.  
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Predicting skepticism 
Climate change skepticism was modelled as the product of the worldview 
measures and relevant demographic predictors. While I did not anticipate experimental 
condition to meaningfully influence skepticism, I also sought to examine whether 
accounting for condition impacted model performance to explore any unanticipated 
effects or systematic failures of assignment to conditions. Thus, models were fit that both 
included and did not include image condition. When compared using LOO IC, the 
models were virtually indistinguishable (LOO IC difference = -0.60, SE = 4.56). The 
model including condition received ~56% of the LOO model weight. While the influence 
of including this variable was expected to be minimal in terms of prediction as a result, it 
was entered nevertheless to better account for the structure of the data and original 
design. Collinearity diagnostics were well within acceptable ranges for this model and all 
others reported (variance inflation factors < 2).  
Figure 15 displays the full posterior distributions of key model parameters in the 
skepticism model, and figure 16 provides a decomposition of the fitted interaction 
intervals for the HE*IC interaction. Overall, this model of skepticism explained 
approximately 25% (95% posterior interval = 23%, 28%) of the variance. HE had the 
largest influence on skepticism, with a 1 SD increase in HE associated with a .59 unit 
increase in skepticism. 
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Figure 15. Posterior distributions of climate change skepticism model. Full posterior 
distributions from Bayesian hierarchical regression model. Vertical blue lines represent 
posterior medians and shaded intervals represent 50% posterior intervals. 
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Figure 16. Marginal effect of HE x IC interaction on skepticism. Results come from a 
Bayesian hierarchical regression model. Predictors were standardized for the analysis. 
Blue, green, and red lines thus represent -1 SD, the mean, and +1 SD, respectively. 
Shaded intervals are 95% fitted regression intervals. 
Right-leaning political views were the second strongest positive predictor of 
skepticism. Age had a negative influence on skepticism such that an increase of 1 SD in 
age lead to a roughly .16 unit decrease in skepticism, when adjusting for the effect of the 
other model predictors. IC also led to increases in skepticism, although the majority of 
the posterior distribution fell between 0 and .20, suggesting a relatively small effect. The 
interaction between HE and IC produced a negative effect on skepticism scores. 
However, this effect was smaller than the positive main effects of HE or IC, and should 
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be interpreted with caution and a recognition of the size of the estimate. Evaluation of the 
fitted regression intervals for the interaction in figure 16 help portray the nature of this 
effect. At lower levels of HE, higher levels of IC were associated with slightly lower 
degrees of skepticism. However, when plotted on full outcome scale, this effect was very 
small relative to the main effects in the model. 
Perceived threat of climate change impacts 
To predict perceived threats of climate change, I fit a model with the same set of 
predictors as for skepticism. As these threat items were measured after participants saw a 
subset of climate change images, experimental condition was also entered as a predictor 
to incorporate any influences of this design. Furthermore, given the clear conceptual link 
between skepticism of climate change and perceived threats from climate change, 
skepticism was also included in this model as a predictor.  
Candidate models were again fit using Bayesian hierarchical regression, allowing 
the model intercept to vary across each country. This was done to better account for 
variability in perceived threat across the sampled countries, each of which may be prone 
to these impacts to varying degrees. All non-categorical predictors were standardized (M 
= 0, SD = 1). This model accounted for roughly 17% (95% posterior interval = 15%, 
19%), of the variance. Figure 17 provides a plot of the full posterior distributions for the 
key model parameters. The single strongest predictor of threat perceptions was HE, with 
a one standard deviation increase in hierarchical attitudes associated with a roughly .25 
unit decrease in perceived climate change threat. 
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Figure 17. Posterior distributions of climate change threat model. Full posterior 
distributions from Bayesian hierarchical regression model. Vertical blue lines represent 
posterior medians and shaded intervals represent 50% posterior intervals. 
There was only a small amount of variability across each country in terms of threat 
perceptions, as evidenced by the estimated hierarchical standard deviation parameter 
being centered close to zero. Though, the higher degree of uncertainty in this parameter is 
likely due to the limited information available (i.e., variation across 3 countries with 
similar political structures; see figure 18). In particular, participants in the United States 
and Germany reported higher risk perceptions than those in the UK by close to 1 unit. 
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Figure 18. Random intercepts for model predicting perceived threat of climate change: 
countries. Plot depicts the full posterior distributions of the random effects. 
IC, as well as the interaction between HE and IC had small estimated effects, 
nearly half the size of the effect of HE. In spite of their estimates being small, the full 
posterior distributions of both fell entirely below zero. Figure 19 provides a 
decomposition of the interaction and 95% fitted regression intervals. As HE and IC both 
increased, threat perception levels decreased most strongly. In contrast, as IC levels 
increased, the negative effect of HE on threat perceptions was largely attenuated. 
However, it is worth emphasizing again that these estimates are small in magnitude, and 
the fitted regression intervals substantially overlap. This suggests that while this 
interaction may be observed in larger samples and contribute to our understanding of 
threat perceptions at a theoretical level, this effect is likely to be small and may be 
difficult to estimate precisely in smaller sample sizes.  
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In comparison to females, males exhibited a considerable decrease in threat 
perceptions, although the uncertainty in this estimate is larger than for measures of HE 
and IC. Interestingly, in this full model, greater right-leaning political ideology was 
associated with greater, rather than less threat perceptions. However, it is important to 
note that in addition to being a relatively small effect, this effect emerges while adjusting 
for important variables, such as HE, IC, and skepticism, all of which are correlated with 
right-leaning ideologies. Indeed, the bivariate correlation between right-leaning ideology 
and threat perceptions was negative, r = -.05, 95% CI = -.081, -.01, sharing less than 1% 
of their variance. 
Responses to climate change imagery 
To estimate pro-climate change motivations, a Bayesian hierarchical regression 
model was estimated with random intercepts estimated across each image participants 
viewed and across each country in the sample. Prior specifications can be found in 
Appendix B. Figures 20 through 23 display the posterior distributions of key model 
parameters, interaction effects, and visualization of the random intercepts. 
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Figure 19. Marginal effect of HE x IC interaction on threat perceptions. Results come 
from a Bayesian hierarchical regression model. Predictors were standardized for the 
analysis. Blue, green, and red lines thus represent -1 SD, the mean, and +1 SD, 
respectively. Shaded intervals are 95% fitted regression intervals. 
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Figure 20. Posterior distributions of post-image pro-climate change motivations. Full 
posterior distributions from Bayesian hierarchical regression model. Vertical blue lines 
represent posterior medians and shaded intervals represent 50% posterior intervals. 
 In this case, both metric predictors and the outcome were standardized (M = 0, SD 
= 1), and therefore results should be interpreted in terms of standard deviation changes in 
both predictor and outcome. Similar to perceived climate change threats, HE again had 
the strongest influence on responses to the climate change imagery, with a 1 SD increase 
associated with a close to .2 SD decrease in pro-climate change motivations. The effect of 
IC was similarly negative and close to the same magnitude. The entire posterior 
distribution of the interaction effect was narrow and below zero, although the magnitude 
of the effect was less than .15 of an SD. Thus, as with prior findings, the interaction 
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effects are theoretically interesting but small in overall size. Males exhibited more 
negative responses than females, with an effect that rivals the size of a 1 SD change in 
cultural worldviews. Figure 21 provides a decomposition of the interaction effect 
between HE and IC. As with prior models, this effect was small in magnitude and likely 
possesses only limited importance for predictive performance. 
Figure 21. Marginal effect of HE x IC interaction on pro-climate change motivations. 
Results come from a Bayesian hierarchical regression model. Predictors were 
standardized for the analysis. Blue, green, and red lines thus represent -1 SD, the mean, 
and +1 SD, respectively. Shaded intervals are 95% fitted regression intervals. 
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Figure 22. Random intercepts for pro-climate change motivations model: countries. Plot 
depicts the full posterior distributions of the random effects. 
Figure 22 displays the posterior distributions of the random intercepts across each 
country. These effects were small in magnitude on the standardized scale, with US and 
German participants reporting greater pro-climate change motivations than the UK 
respondents. Figure 23 provides a decomposition of the random intercepts estimated 
across each image. There was modest but consistent variability across each of the images 
presented. The image in the solutions condition depicting kids learning about solar panels 
was more positively received on average than the other images presented. Images of a 
man eating meat, and national politicians, were less motivating for participants. 
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Figure 23. Random intercepts for pro-climate change model: images. Plot depicts the full 
posterior distributions of the random effects across each image. 
 
Similar to the climate change motivations model, to estimate the effects of these 
predictors on self-reported understanding of the climate change imagery random 
intercepts were estimated across country and across each image viewed. Ordinal 
regression was performed on this outcome, using a cumulative logit model. Priors and 
model details are provided in Appendix B.  
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Figure 24. Posterior distributions of understanding of climate change imagery. Full 
posterior distributions from Bayesian ordinal hierarchical regression model. Vertical blue 
lines represent posterior medians and shaded intervals represent 50% posterior intervals. 
Coefficients are on the log scale. For visual clarity of the full posterior distributions, the 
hierarchical standard deviations and effect of condition are omitted. 
HE had the most robust negative influence in the model, although this effect was 
not particularly large in magnitude, Posterior Median = -.18, 95% HPDI = -.21, -.15, 
Odds Ratio (OR) = 0.835 (see figure 24). The estimates of the effect of experimental 
condition was highly variable, with little evidence to suggest a meaningful positive or 
negative effect. Due to their large variability in comparison to the other predictors, these 
effects are omitted from figure 24 depiction for visual clarity of the posterior 
distributions. IC also negatively influenced self-reported understanding, although the 
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effect was roughly half the size of the effect of HE, Posterior Median = -.07, 95% HPDI 
= -.10, -.04, OR = -.932. There was little evidence to suggest a meaningful interaction 
between HE and IC in this model. The posterior probability of the interaction term was 
constrained almost entirely to values around zero, Posterior Median = .02, 95% HPID = -
.002, .04. Skepticism and age had slightly larger estimates that than the HE*IC 
interaction, both producing negative associations with understanding. The effect of 
gender was negative, although the majority of the posterior probability was centered 
around zero, Posterior Median = -.03, 95% HPDI = -.08, .03. Figure 25 depicts all of the 
random intercept estimates on the log scale, including both the intercept estimates across 
country and across images. As with the other measures, there was notable variability 
across these estimates. Germany reported the greatest understanding of the images, 
followed by the US and the UK. Images of the politicians, meat consumption, as well as 
other images of climate change impacts, had more negative influences on understanding. 
The most understood images included the imagery of a polar bear (impacts), smokestacks 
(causes), and solar panels (solutions). 
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Figure 25. Random intercepts for the image understanding model. 
 
The same model configuration was used to estimate affective reactions. In the 
case of affective reactions, IC had a stronger effect on negative affect than HE, with a 1 
SD increase leading to a roughly .25 unit increase in negative affect. The posterior 
distribution of the interaction effect between HE and IC was similar in size, though 
measured more precisely, than the effect of HE. Evaluation of figure 27 provides a 
depiction of the estimated interaction effect. 
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Figure 26. Posterior distributions of negative affect in response to climate change 
imagery. Full posterior distributions from Bayesian ordinal hierarchical regression model. 
Vertical blue lines represent posterior medians and shaded intervals represent 50% 
posterior intervals. For visual clarity of the full posterior distributions, the hierarchical 
standard deviations and effect of condition are omitted. 
 There was substantial overlap in the interval estimates, although the general 
pattern is that increasing HE lead to slightly greater negative affective reactions 
specifically when individuals were higher in IC. Compared with prior models, climate 
change skepticism and political leaning both emerged are more pronounced predictors 
than the cultural worldviews of affective reactions. These effects were in the opposite 
direction of the worldviews. A 1 SD increase in skepticism was associated with a 
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decrease in negative affect equivalent to somewhere between -.3 and -.5 scale point 
difference. The pattern of effects of political leaning was very similar, though the effect 
was centered around a decrease of .25 units on the outcome scale. The majority of the 
posterior distribution for the estimated gender effect fell below zero, with males reporting 
less negative affect relative to females. Finally, a 1 SD increase in age was associated 
with greater negative affective reactions with an effect magnitude rivaling that of IC.  
 
Figure 27. Marginal effect of HE x IC interaction on negative affect from climate change 
imagery. Results come from a Bayesian hierarchical regression model. Predictors were 
standardized for the analysis. Blue, green, and red lines thus represent -1 SD, the mean, 
and +1 SD, respectively. Shaded intervals are 95% fitted regression intervals. 
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Figure 28. Random intercepts for negative affect model: countries. Plot depicts the full 
posterior distributions of the random effects. 
 
Figures 28 and 29 depict the posterior distribution estimates of the random intercepts in 
the affect model. On average, each nation in the sample reported negative affect reactions 
to the imagery. The variability between country was smaller in this case than prior 
random intercept models. Germany and the UK both reported greater negative affect than 
US participants, although as depicted in figure 28, there was substantial interval overlap. 
Figure 29 demonstrates greater variation in climate change imagery in terms of affective 
reactions. Images of politicians, protestors (‘Blueface’), and meat consumption produced 
less negative reactions than other images. Images producing more negative affect 
included the images of smokestacks, solar panels, and children learning about solar 
panels. 
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Figure 29. Random intercepts for negative affect model: images. Plot depicts the full 
posterior distributions of the random effects across each image. 
 
Discussion 
 The results of the Bayesian hierarchical regression models yield interesting 
insights to accompany the main body text of Chapter 4. In particular, these follow-up 
analyses took a more integrative, holistic approach to modelling climate change 
skepticism and responses to the climate change imagery. After building these 
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theoretically informed models, there was little evidence to suggest a robust difference in 
general responses to different types of climate change imagery (i.e., no robust 
experimental treatment effects). However, a number of other important findings were 
uncovered. In support of Kahan et al. (2011; 2017), HE had a strong influence on climate 
change skepticism, with those higher in hierarchical values reporting greater levels of 
skepticism, as well as lower perceived threats from climate change, and lower pro-
climate change motivations. The effect of IC was typically in the same direction and 
followed a similar pattern as HE, although smaller in magnitude. Interestingly, this 
pattern diverged in the context of negative affective reactions. Specifically, IC was 
associated with greater negative affective reactions, following the opposite pattern of HE 
and of IC on other items.  
The evidence for interaction effects emerged across the measures of responses to 
climate change imagery, although again these effects were small in magnitude. In 
general, each interaction effect followed a similar pattern for the post-image items, with 
combinations of high HE and high IC leading to more negative outcomes for climate 
change engagement. As there is considerable uncertainty in the fitted regression intervals 
for these models, interpretation of specific interaction patterns should be done with 
caution. 
Across the majority of models, the worldview measures, especially HE, appeared 
to generate a more robust influence than political ideology and climate change 
skepticism. This may be in part because these worldviews are though to form a 
foundation of ideological perspectives and views on climate change, and thus may be 
more proximal to the outcomes of interest than these other measures. Interestingly, this 
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pattern changed in the context of affective reactions, with both skepticism and political 
leaning having stronger effects on affective reactions than the worldview measures. At 
this point, I do not have any theoretical explanation as to why these measures would 
operate differently for affect in comparison with other post-image responses. Future work 
should further unpack this phenomenon to make sense of which measures are more 
versus less related to different types of worldview and identity measures. 
The findings in this study also suggest that future scale construction work is 
needed to better measure each of these constructs. The 2-item measure of climate change 
skepticism had a lower inter-item correlation than I had anticipated, leading to greater 
uncertainty in this measure. The fact that the four-factor structure of the cultural 
worldview measures was a substantially better fit to the data is encouraging, as this 
structure in fact more accurately captures the design of the scale. However, this structure 
is slightly at odds with the analytic approach of creating two separate composite 
measures by reverse coding portions of the items of interest. Furthermore, several models 
were estimated using underlying Gaussian assumptions in places where ordinal 
regression may have been used as an alternative. This approach was retained for 
comparability with past research findings, as well as the large sample size rendering 
Gaussian assumptions more plausible. While we retained this approach to remain 
consistent with past literature, future work should more comprehensively consider ways 
to improve both the validity and reliability of the measures, while also identifying which 
future models would be more appropriately assessed using ordinal regression instead of 
the approach presented here. The Bayesian inferential approach was useful in uncovering 
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an making sense of these estimates, and also offers a useful starting point for developing 
more informed prior distributions for future studies.  
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Summary of Key Findings 
 The work presented throughout this manuscript examined several different sets of 
empirical findings nested under the larger umbrella of identity-protective cognition. The 
research involved both qualitative and quantitative investigations, and included 
correlational and experimental designs. Statistical inference was performed using both 
frequentist and Bayesian statistical methods, offering an insight into the relative 
contributions of each. In Chapter 2, I presented work examining how identity-protective 
process, particularly those related to climate change skepticism, influence how the public 
perceives and responses to natural disasters that have become associated with climate 
change. Linking a disaster with climate change (relative to a ‘natural’ cause) led those 
with greater climate change skepticism to engage in justifications to withhold aid from 
disaster victims, while also suppressing donation intentions. 
Chapter 3 looked at the role of contextually-activated social identities in 
responding to personally-relevant environmental problems. In the context of the 
Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal, this work highlights that different identities can 
sometimes have competing and sometimes cooperative effects on influencing pro-
environmental responses. While these contextually activated identities influenced 
judgments of personal responsibility and intentions to fix affected vehicles (especially 
among high environmental identifiers), evidence for their interactive effects were limited 
at best. There was little evidence to suggest a strong interaction between identities in 
motivating actual intentions to fix affected vehicles. 
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Finally, Chapter 4 altered the traditional research paradigm in this domain by 
evaluating public responses to different types of visual imagery used to depict climate 
change. This chapter provided both qualitative and quantitative insights to describe these 
responses and how they vary across ideological perspectives. Additional Bayesian 
statistical modelling identified the ways in which cultural worldviews impact climate 
change skepticism, perceived threats from climate change, and responses to climate 
change imagery. In particular, being higher in hierarchical and individualistic worldviews 
predicted greater skepticism, fewer pro-climate change motivations, and less perceived 
threat from climate change impacts. On the other hand, higher individualism was 
associated with more negative affective reactions to climate change imagery than 
hierarchicalism. In most cases, the effects of these worldviews were larger than those for 
political ideology or climate change skepticism. 
Overarching Implications for Theory and Practice 
 The findings of the aforementioned research have several implications for the role 
of ICT in responding to environmental problems. However, given the focus on 
attitudinal-based assessments in this research, direct implications for applied practice 
should be made with considerable caution. Chapter 2 highlights the potential for 
motivated reasoning processes activated in defense of one’s identity to extend beyond the 
proximal belief (i.e., climate change beliefs) and on to other distal outcomes. Caution 
from media outlets and communicators about ‘overselling’ the connection between 
climate change and other outcomes is warranted, as this may be polarizing for certain 
audiences that may otherwise respond more positively. This work compliments Kahan et 
al. (2017) in particular, and suggests that this second-order approach may be a promising 
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area for future theoretical and applied work. The extent to which such motivated 
processes emerge on other politicized issues aside from climate change, however, 
remains to be clearly demonstrated.  
Chapter 3 directly examined how multiple social identities may simultaneously 
and interactively influence how individuals make judgments about personal responsibility 
for environmental problems. This work presented an initial investigation into the 
processes involved, and future work should take steps to provide fruitful follow ups. In 
particular, while there was suggestion of a potential interaction effect whereby judgments 
of responsibility were greatest when individuals were high in both VW/diesel and 
environmental identities, evidence for effects on behavioral intentions was low. And, 
model comparisons for predictive performance suggested little added value by including 
the interaction term on these measures. Therefore, I am cautious to offer any broader 
insights for applied practice in this case until central theoretical and empirical questions 
are addressed. 
Taken together however, the findings of chapters 2 and 3 yield an important 
question for future research: Do identity-protective processes primarily influence 
attitudinal responses, or do they also influence behavior directly? And, if so, how and 
when does this occur, and what are the best steps for modelling this process? In the 
findings of both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, ICT effects examined through the interaction 
models yielded stronger evidence for their effects on attitudes (e.g., donation 
justifications, perceived responsibility) than on behavioral intentions. This is a point that 
has not been clearly discussed in the context of ICT, or in the context of motivated 
reasoning and climate change/environmental psychology more broadly. 
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Chapter 4 extends theory and research on ICT into the domain of visual imagery, 
while also looking at the processes surrounding ICT in a multi-national context. To my 
knowledge this was the first examination of this kind. In the context of climate change 
imagery, the findings from Chapter 4 suggest that similar ideological and worldview 
motives shape responses to images as observed in more text-heavy mediums. Therefore, 
the use of visual imagery may unfortunately not be a panacea for applied practice in 
terms of directly overcoming these motives. However, as the original design of this study 
was not tailored to yield experimental insights into the role of different worldviews in 
driving responses to imagery, implications for theory aside from understanding bivariate 
construct associations may be limited. Also, while the research did identify similar 
psychometric properties across each of the three countries examined, this might be 
expected given the similar philosophical histories of the countries examined. At a macro-
theoretical level, the ICT suffers from an Anglo-centric focus; future work might extend 
conceptualizations of worldviews and identities to be more transnational in its approach 
and application. 
Finally, one theoretical issue that was glossed over in the main body of research 
was a consideration of the extent to which the psychological processes discussed are 
indeed evidence for an identity protective motive, as opposed to another explanation. 
Using attitudes to express one’s identity even at personal cost (e.g., the link between 
environmental identity and perceived responsibility discussed in Chapter 3) may also be 
applicable to some of the findings presented. This is also a point which the literature has 
not clearly addressed: What, if anything, distinguishes different identity-related motives 
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from one another, and how do we best measure this process? Future work involving both 
observational, experimental, and qualitative research is needed to unpack this question. 
Limitations and Other Considerations 
 The three projects described in this document suffer from several overarching 
limitations that warrant consideration. First, this work would have benefitted by a more 
careful development of scale measures for each construct. For instance, political ideology 
was measured slightly differently in each study, as were environmental attitudes and 
climate change skepticism. Further, in certain studies only single-item measures were 
used of constructs. While some of these decisions were justified by the limited past 
research on certain of the issues discussed and survey limitations, this criticism is not one 
that should be ignored or taken lightly. Bayesian statistician and political scientist 
Andrew Gelman once said the following regarding measurement error and inference in 
such designs:  
“…when effect size [sic] is tiny and measurement error is huge, you’re essentially 
trying to use a bathroom scale to weigh a feather—and the feather is resting 
loosely in the pouch of a kangaroo that is vigorously jumping up and down.” 
(Gelman, 2015) 
This metaphor runs the risk of being too applicable in a number of the findings reported 
here, particularly those in Chapter 2 and 3. While this indictment regarding measurement 
error and effect sizes plagues much of the published literature in this domain (see below) 
and I took steps to address this as best as possible, it is important moving forward to 
address this issue. For example, in spite of the benefits of focusing on a Bayesian 
statistical estimation approach, low reliability of measures directly influences the degree 
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of model uncertainty and the precision of the inferences that can be made. Statistical 
methods cannot salvage imprecise measurement and design. 
 This work is also limited by its emphasis on self-report attitudinal measures in the 
absence of measures of proximal behavioral outcomes. This limitation is one that plagues 
much of the research in this domain. While these attitudinal measures are of interest for 
theoretical aims, they may do little to speak to the real-world outcomes of interest to 
practitioners. Future work should seek to go beyond this measurement filter, and do more 
to examine a full range of outcomes. Finally, this work does not directly contribute to our 
understanding of whether the ICT account of polarization is more or less credible than 
other accounts, such as the role of large misinformation campaigns or political elite cues. 
Concluding Thoughts: Towards a Robust Science of Science Communication 
 Amidst a pervasively polarized climate for the communication of science and 
environmental risks, it is vital that social scientists offer the best evidence possible to 
practitioners. This requires a comprehensive, careful investigation of science 
communication, and how both knowledge and ideology influence the decision making 
process. To date, unfortunately, meaningful discussions among scholars on this issue 
have been mostly supplanted by competing debates over what ‘works’ versus what 
‘doesn’t work’ in the context of communication, without providing basic clarity 
regarding what it means for one these approaches to ‘work’. New papers are published 
with increasing frequency proclaiming that communicating scientific consensus to the 
public is a powerful tool to increase engagement (e.g., van der Linden et al., 2015), that 
scientific consensus is not worth the attention it is given as a rhetorical device (e.g., 
Pearce et al., 2017), and that the evidence for the role of consensus in motivating 
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engagement is flawed (e.g., Kahan, 2017). On the other hand, ICT has recently faced 
criticism from those who perceive it as implying that knowledge, or awareness of the 
judgment of scientific experts, are not important for motivating public engagement (van 
der Linden, 2015). Yet, within the current paradigms of research, it is hard to imagine 
such debates being resolved without substantial changes to current practices. While it is 
common to resolve such conversations by abstractly recommending the need for more 
research, I instead offer several methodological and theoretical considerations to 
hopefully advance a more robust science of science communication.  
The connection between attitudes and behavior in science communication 
research is perhaps the most central problem. Put shortly, few hypotheses in science 
communication research make clear specifications regarding what 
techniques/characteristics lead to changes in behavioral versus attitudinal outcomes of 
interest. These distinctions are rarely given the close consideration they deserve, perhaps 
due to the immense difficulty in studying behavioral processes at scale. This lack of 
clarity and standardization regarding what the most important outcomes are in science 
communication research makes it difficult to make meaningful comparisons among 
studies or techniques. Furthermore, a robust science of science communication demands 
greater measurement precision. Loken and Gelman (2017), for example, highlight the 
fundamental problems in inferring evidence from studies with small sample sizes given 
high degrees of measurement error that are common in the social sciences. Yet, in most 
research in the science communication field, little discussion is offered about the role of 
measurement issues, nor is consideration frequently given to their impact on inferences. 
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 The over-emphasis on null hypothesis significance testing as the chief criteria for 
evaluating the ‘success’ of an experiment also tends to lead to a binary-decision making 
process rather than a more nuanced understanding of how to glean practical evidence 
from statistical findings. Abandoning statistical significance and NHST in favor of a 
combination of approaches full would be helpful in this regard (Loken & Gelman, 2017; 
McShane et al., 2018). However, no statistical tool is foolproof. Therefore, a more 
comprehensive workflow of qualitative and quantitative inquiry to address specific 
problems in science communication would be beneficial.  
Making meaningful advances to improve our responses to climate change and 
other environmental problems necessitates a healthy social science capable of speaking to 
questions of interest for maximizing our understanding of effective public engagement. A 
robust science of science communication, one which is open, reproducible, and 
theoretically driven, is of the utmost importance.  
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The main text, figures and tables of Chapter 2 are reproduced exactly as they appeared in 
the print version of the published article. However, following publication, several slight 
rounding errors were identified by the authors. At the suggestion of the editor, this was 
disclosed at on the PubPeer link for this article 
(https://blog.pubpeer.com/publications/811A98DA7D327F9592B0803763FA04#2). The 
rounding errors have been corrected in the current reproduced version. 
 
Chapter 4 Reference 
Chapman, D. A., Corner, A., Webster, R., & Markowitz, E. M. (2016). Climate visuals: a  
mixed methods investigation of public perceptions of climate images in three 
countries. Global Environmental Change, 41, 172-182. 
 
The main text, figures and tables of Chapter 2 are reproduced exactly as they appeared in 
the print version of the published article. 
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APPENDIX B 
BAYESIAN MODELS AND PRIOR SPECIFICATIONS 
 
All Bayesian statistical models were estimated using the ‘brms’ package for R 
(Burkner, 2017). Brms is an R package which harnesses Stan (Carpenter et al. 2017) on 
the backend to perform full Bayesian inference using Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC, 
No-U-Turn Sampler [NUTS]). Below, I provide a description of the models tested, 
divided by chapter. While some differences exist across models, the general principles to 
modelling (e.g., philosophical approach on prior specification) were quite similar across 
each. 
Each model was estimated using three Markov chains with 4,000 sampling 
iterations per chain, 2,000 of which were designated as warmup. Thus, posterior 
inference was based on an effective sample size up to 6,000 samples. However, as is 
common, the number of effective samples varies from parameter to parameter during 
estimation. One of the chief benefits of HMC with a NUTS sampler is that, in addition to 
not needing to use conjugate priors, it also samples the parameter space much more 
efficiently than alternatives; whereas other samplers (e.g., JAGS) typically require long 
burn-in periods and larger numbers of iterations to sample distributions, HMC can 
construct posterior distributions efficiently with far fewer iterations (note, warm-up 
iterations are not the same as burn-in samples, which are discarded in JAGS). 
Initial model checks for divergent transitions in the Markov chains or other 
problems were performed on simplified versions of the models (e.g., a model with just 2 
chains of 2,000 samples) to diagnose sampling problems prior to full model estimation 
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(to save computation time). In the case of the hierarchical models, these initial checks 
helped identify the need to place more regularizing priors on the hierarchical standard 
deviations (see below), which is quite common in cases with limited information (e.g., 
comparing only three countries). These checks also helped calibrate aspects of the chains 
to make them more efficient (e.g., increasing the delta from the default of .80 to .95). 
Details on why/how increasing the delta of the algorithm improves estimation is beyond 
the scope of this document. It will suffice to say that increasing the delta increases the 
granularity of the sampling process, but is computationally expensive. A default of .8 is 
used in Stan, but it is recommended to increase this when divergent transitions emerge.  
For every model evaluated, a variety of checks were performed. Trace plots were 
evaluated to ensure that the chains mixed adequately, and Rhat was computed for each 
model. Rhat is a Bayesian diagnostic which approximates the degree to which the chains 
mix together appropriately; Rhat values above 1.00 warrant investigation and caution in 
interpretation (Gelman et al. 2013). In no case did these models have Rhat values that 
exceeded 1, nor were there divergent transitions found in the chains. Posterior predictive 
checks were evaluated to loosely diagnose whether the model specifications could 
accurately reconstruct the distribution of the outcome measures (Gelman et al. 2013). 
Plots of these checks can be provided upon request, along with full model code, data, 
scripts, and study materials. In each case, these checks were adequate to suggest that 
these models could recreate the outcome distributions with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy. While in no way definitive, these checks suggest that there are not glaring 
problems with the Markov chains or posterior distributions which warrant attention, 
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beyond the specific sampling assumptions (e.g., treating binned survey responses as 
generating from an underlying normal distribution as opposed to another).. 
Below I provide a simplified notation of the model specification using loose 
mathematical notation (adapted from the approach of McElreath, 2016). To avoid 
redundancy, as many of the models were estimated using a highly similar philosophy to 
prior specification, I instead provide details on the modelling strategy overall, and denote 
specific changes to these as well as their justification. For example, the following 
displays model code for a simplified Bayesian linear regression model with 2 predictors: 
Y ~ normal�μi, σ� 
μi= ∝ + β1*predictor+ β2*predictor 
α ~ normal(0,3) 
β1 ~ normal(0,1) 
β2 ~ normal(0,1) 
σ ~ half cauchy(0,1) 
 
Where Y is the outcome, which is modelled as being normally distributed with a 
mean (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖) and residual error, sigma (𝜎𝜎). The ‘~’ symbol should be read as ‘is distributed 
as’. Then, the mean of the model is set as being equal to our model formula, containing 
the model intercept (∝), and a regression coefficient for each predictor (𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2). The 
priors on the intercept and predictors are specified in the final few lines of code above. 
Specifically 𝛼𝛼 ~ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(0,3) can be read as ‘the model intercept is normal distributed 
with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 3.’ The same approach is followed to read 
the priors for the model predictors. Finally, the last line of the formula can be read as: 
‘the residual standard deviation of the model is distributed as a half Cauchy distribution 
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with a location of 0 and scale of 1’. In the case of such residual standard deviation priors, 
the parameters are always a ‘half’ Cauchy distribution (i.e., half Cauchy rather than 
Cauchy). This is because the standard deviation estimated always has a lower bound of 
zero. The same is true of priors placed on hierarchical standard deviation parameters. 
Throughout all models, I adopt recommendations of Gelman et al. (2013) and the 
Stan Development Team (2018), using weakly informative prior distributions that 
promote regularization on the model parameters. All metric predictors for each model are 
standardized (M = 0, SD = 1). Outcome measures are kept on their original scale unless 
otherwise noted. Below, I provide a brief description of the models tested, divided by 
chapter. 
Chapter 2 
 Each Bayesian model in chapter 2 was fit using weakly informative priors scaled 
to the response distribution and a Gaussian response distribution. In this case, normal 
distribution priors for model intercepts were adjusted for each model to be centered near 
the median of the response distribution with a slightly wider standard deviation than the 
scaled distribution (e.g., normal(5,2)). Regression parameters were given a normal 
distribution prior (normal(0,1)). Residual error of the model (sigma) was given a half 
Cauchy prior (location = 0, scale = 2). Each model converged with no direct changes 
being made to the sampling algorithm.   
Chapter 3: 
 For the models of judgments of responsibility, the same strategy was applied as 
chapter 2, with the exception of also estimating an ordinal regression model. Judgments 
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of responsibility and intentions to fix affected vehicles were estimated using a Gaussian 
response distribution, regularizing priors on the regression coefficients (normal(0,1)) and 
a half Cauchy prior on sigma (0, 2). Given the skew in these items, the model intercepts 
were estimated using a weakly informative t-distribution prior centered near the median 
of the response distribution (e.g., student_t(3,3,2) which possesses wider tails than the 
normal distribution. This distribution is also used in several other models further below. 
The model of fix timing was estimated using a cumulative response distribution, logit 
link function, and flexible category thresholds, which implements ordinal regression. In 
these models, there is no sigma to be estimated. Mildly regularizing priors were again fit 
on the regression coefficients (normal(0,1)) and the intercept (student_t(3,0,1)). All 
models converged and no changes were made to the estimation algorithms. 
Chapter 4 
 The model of climate change skepticism was estimated using a hierarchical linear 
regression model using a Gaussian response distribution. As there was a mixture of 
categorical and metric predictors, a slightly wider normal distribution prior (normal(0,2)) 
was placed on all regression coefficients. The intercept was centered near the median of 
the response distribution (normal(4,1)), and sigma was given a half Cauchy prior (0, 1). 
As this model also has random intercepts estimates, the model also requires placing a 
prior on the hierarchical standard deviation estimate (i.e., the variability in the random 
effects estimate). The model was initially fit with a half-normal prior (0,.5), although 
several divergent transitions occurred. A more informative prior was then placed on this 
parameter (half-normal(0,.1)).In addition, the delta for the estimation algorithm was 
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increased from .8 (the default) to .99. This specification lead to convergence with no 
divergent transitions.  
 The climate change threat model was identical in its specification approach as the 
skepticism model. Regularizing priors were placed again on the regression coefficients 
(normal(0,2)), the intercept (normal(5,1)), and sigma (half Cauchy(0, 1)). Given greater 
variability in the random intercept, a half normal prior (0,.2) with slightly wider scale was 
placed on this parameter. Given the expectation of some diverging transitions, the delta 
of the model was increased to .99 prior to initial estimation. The model summary 
indicated no issues of diverging transitions for this model.  
 In the pro-climate change motivation model and those that follow below, random 
intercepts were estimated both for country and for the images participants rated. Both 
predictors and outcomes were standardized in the motivation model, requiring slightly 
more narrow priors on coefficients given that effects are now on the standardized scale. 
Regularizing priors were placed on the regression coefficients (normal(0,.5), intercept 
(student_t(3,0,.5)), and sigma (half Cauchy (0, 1)). The priors on the hierarchical standard 
deviations for both images and countries were half-normal priors with a narrow deviation 
(normal(0,.2)). After warnings of several divergent transitions, the delta was increased to 
.90, at which point the divergences disappeared.  
The model for affect was very similar. However, as the outcome is not 
standardized in this case, priors on the coefficients and intercept were spread out slightly 
to allow more variability (normal(0,1) and student_t(3,0,2) respectively). The other priors 
were the same as the previous model.  
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The hierarchical model of image understanding was estimated using a cumulative 
response family and logit link function. As such, the parameters are estimated on the log 
scale. Prior specifications were identical to the affect model, with the exception that the 
prior on sigma was removed. 
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APPENDIX C 
SUPPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES ACCOMPANYING CHAPTER 4 
 
Below is a direct reproduction of the supplementary online material published in 
Chapman et al. (2016) and discussed in Chapter 4. 
Beliefs about Others’ Reactions to the Images 
In addition to the main dependent measures covered, we also assessed 
participants’ beliefs about how they thought others would react to the images they saw. 
We performed identical analyses as those described in the full text, which are described 
below. We asked four items that gauged how participants thought others would react to 
the images. These assessed whether the image would influence perceived urgency 
(“Would this image make someone feel like climate change is a more urgent problem or 
less urgent problem?” 1 = not at all urgent, 5= very urgent), affect support for climate 
change prevention and adaptation policies (“After seeing this image, how supportive do 
you think someone would be of government policies focused primarily on preventing 
climate change?”; “After seeing this image, how supportive do you think someone would 
be of policies focused primarily on preparing or adapting to future climate change 
impacts?”; 1 = not at all supportive, 5 = very supportive) and whether the image would 
be shared by others (“How willing do you think others would be to share this image on 
social media or talk about it with their family and friends?” 1 = not at all willing, 5 = very 
willing). Table C1 below displays the correlations between these measures and the other 
dependent measures. 
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Table C1. Bivariate correlations between all image-related dependent measures. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Understanding 
(1) 
1 
        
 
Emotional 
response (2) 
.067 1 
       
 
Seek out 
information (3) 
.634 .090 1 
      
 
Share image 
with others (4) 
.580 .109 .818 1 
     
 
Change 
personal 
behavior (5) 
.601 .057** .857 .834 1 
    
 
Support 
government 
climate policy 
(6) 
.554 .037* .747 .809 .828 1 
   
 
Will increase 
urgency (7) 
.613 .053** .771 .773 .815 .780 1 
  
 
Will increase 
mitigation 
support (8) 
.533 .095 .702 .72 .755 .720 .847 1 
 
 
Will increase 
adaptation 
support (9) 
.566 .089 .741 .741 .787 .764 .889 .859 1  
Others will 
share image 
(10) 
.551 .089 .761 .775 .766 .685 .841 .806 .829 1 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, all other coefficients are significant at p < .001 
 
 Table C2 displays the results of analyses examining the effects of image condition 
on participants’ beliefs about how others would react to the images they saw. Across all 
four items, images depicting climate change impacts were rated as most likely to increase 
urgency, support for prevention and adaptation policies, and be shared by others.  
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Table C3 displays country-level differences in beliefs about others reactions to the 
images. Consistent with the outcome measures described in the main text, Germans 
exhibited the highest level of beliefs that others would be motivated by these images, 
while those in the U.K. exhibited the lowest levels of belief that the images would 
motivate others or increase support for climate change policy. There were no significant 
interactions between country and image type on these measures. 
Table C2. Effects of image type on perceptions of others’ reactions to the images. 
Note. Post-hoc analyses were performed separately for each item to compare the mean 
differences between conditions using Tukey’s adjustment for multiple comparisons. For 
each, all mean differences are significant at p < .001.  
 
Table C3. Country-level differences in beliefs about others’ responses to the images. 
Item F R2 Country Mean SD 
Will increase 
Others’ Urgency 35.725*** .023 
U.K. 3.09 .867 
U.S. 3.29 .921 
Item F R2 Condition M SD 
Will increase 
Others’ Urgency 68.963*** .044 
Causes 3.26 .815 
Impacts 3.49 .887 
Solutions 3.27 .893 
Will increase 
support for 
Prevention Policy 
51.353*** .033 
Causes 3.13 .901 
Impacts 3.36 .973 
Solutions 2.94 .938 
 
Will increase 
support for 
adaptation policy 
44.948*** .029 
Causes 3.16 .882 
Impacts 3.39 .961 
Solutions 2.99 .934 
Others will be 
motivated to share  
the images 
49.103*** .032 
Causes 2.54 .734 
Impacts 2.74 .773 
Solutions 2.40 .761 
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Germany 3.42 .834 
Will increase 
support for 
Prevention Policy 
10.756*** .007 
U.K. 3.03 .906 
U.S. 3.16c .976 
Germany 3.23c .968 
Will increase 
support for 
adaptation policy 
28.477*** .019 
U.K. 3.03 .917 
U.S. 3.17 .980 
Germany 3.34 .895 
Others will be 
motivated to 
share  
the images 
33.556*** .022 
U.K. 2.41 .753 
U.S. 2.59 .795 
Germany 2.68 .730 
Note. Post-hoc analyses to examine between-country differences were performed using 
Tukey’s adjustment. Matching superscripts denote post-hoc tests that did not attain 
significance. All other post-hoc comparisons are significant at p < .05 
 
We also examined whether there were interactions between image type and 
climate change skepticism on beliefs about others’ reactions to the images. Table C4 
displays the results of these analyses. Primarily, the significant interaction patterns for 
these measures suggest that skepticism predicts lower beliefs that images of impacts will 
affect others’ policy support and sense of urgency, but does not predict beliefs about 
others’ responses to the causes or solutions images. For beliefs about which images 
others would be motivated to share, skepticism marginally predicts greater beliefs that 
others will share solutions images, whereas the pattern is in the opposite direction 
(though nonsignificant) for causes and impacts images.  
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Table C4. Interactions between climate change skepticism and imagery condition on 
beliefs about others’ responses to the images. 
Variable Interaction (F) Condition b SE 
95% Confidence 
Intervals 
  Causes -.01 .02 -.043 .023 
Will increase Others’ 
Urgency 6.803** Impacts 
-
.06*** .02 -.088 -.026 
  Solutions .03† .02 -.005 .060 
       
  Causes .004 .02 -.032 .039 
Will increase support 
for Prevention Policy 4.093* Impacts -.04* .02 -.077 -.009 
  Solutions .03 .02 -.008 .063 
       
  Causes .003 .02 -.032 .038 
Will increase support 
for adaptation policy 3.397* Impacts -.04* .02 -.073 -.006 
  Solutions .02 .02 -.012 .058 
       
  Causes .02 .01 -.013 .044 
Others will be 
motivated to share 
the images 
3.275* Impacts -.02 .01 -.049 .006 
  Solutions .03† .01 -.001 .056 
Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 
 
Analyses Involving Political Ideology 
The political ideology of participants was measured using a single item index of 
the extent to which they reported being on the left or right of the political spectrum (0= 
left, 10= right; M = 5.05, SD = 2.155). Ideological beliefs did not significantly differ 
 163 
between experimental conditions, F(2, 3011)= 1.733, p = .177, R2 = .001). However, 
there were small cross-national differences on this measure, F(2, 3011) = 15.797, p < 
.001, R2 = .01), with the United States (M = 5.26, SD = 2.294) and United Kingdom (M = 
5.15, SD = 2.073) being slightly more to the political right than the German sample (M = 
4.75, SD = 2.059; differences between U.S. and U.K. are not statistically significant, but 
both significantly differed from Germany at p < .001).  
Similar to our analyses for climate change skepticism, we examined whether 
participants’ responses to the different image types (collapsed across country of origin) 
were moderated by the political ideology of the respondents. There was a significant 
interaction between image condition and ideology on affective reactivity to the images, 
F(2, 3008) = 38.865, p < .001. In both the causes imagery and impacts imagery 
conditions, individuals on the political right reported less negative affective (i.e., more 
positive) responses to the imagery than those on the political left (slope for ideology in 
causes condition: b = .24, SE = .03, p < .001, 95% CI’s = .162, .291; slope for ideology in 
the impacts condition: b = .28, SE = .03, p < .001, 95% CI’s = .238, .338. In contrast, in 
the solutions imagery condition, political ideology no longer significantly predicted 
affective reactivity (b= -.003, SE = .02, p = .912, 95% CI’s = -.052, .046), suggesting that 
those on the political left and right reported similar levels of affect after viewing these 
images. 
 There was also a significant interaction between imagery type and ideology on 
beliefs about the effect of images on other peoples’ support for climate change adaptation 
policies, F(2, 3008) = 3.082, p = .046. In the causes imagery condition, greater 
conservatism (i.e., on the political right) predicted greater beliefs that these images would 
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increase others’ support for climate change adaptation (b = .04, SE = .01, p = .004, 95% 
CI’s = .013, .066). In the climate change solutions condition, this same pattern emerged, 
although the slope was only marginally significant (b = .02, SE = .01, p = .076, 95% CI’s 
= -.003, .050). In the climate change impacts condition however, ideology did not 
significantly predict participants’ responses to this item (b = -.01, SE = .01, p = .570, 95% 
CI’s = -.035, .019). 
There was also a marginally significant interaction between ideology and imagery 
condition on participants’ reported beliefs about how the images would affect others’ 
support for climate change mitigation policies, F(2, 3008) = 2.533, p = .08. This 
interaction follows nearly the same general pattern as the findings for the climate change 
adaptation policy interaction. In both the climate change causes and climate change 
solutions conditions, the greater a participant was on the political right of the spectrum, 
the more likely they were to think that these images would increase other people’s 
support for climate change mitigation policies (slope for ideology in causes condition: b 
= .04, SE = .01, p = .005; 95% CI’s: .012, .066; slope for ideology in the solutions 
condition: b = .03, SE = .01, p = .011; 95% CI’s: .008, .061). In the climate change 
impacts condition, ideological beliefs did not significantly predict participants’ beliefs 
about how this image would affect others (b = -.001, SE = .01, p = .931; 95% CI’s: -.028, 
.026). No other significant interaction effects emerged for political ideology. 
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